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Abstract  
The purpose of the thesis was to develop an entirely new ideology and technique which is 
called a client’s NAC (Client’s Network Access Control). The objectives of the thesis were to 
discover methods how a single computer could make conclusions about the connected network 
and validate if the network is trusted or not. This is an entirely new ideology, which has not 
been published on the commercial markets or in academic research. 
 
In a nutshell, the philosophy of the Network Access Control is that all devices requesting 
access to network’s resources are untrusted until they are otherwise proved. The objective was 
to discover if it is possible to conduct same kind of philosophy to a single computer. A 
computer does not trust the network before it has done specific validations from the network 
and depending on the outcome of the validations; network traffic to network is allowed or 
denied.  
 
The discovery in the thesis was that almost every LAN protocol has different kinds of security 
issues. Usually these threats are blocked in the network’s outer perimeter with firewalls in such 
a way that the outside of the network cannot exploit these threats. This does not prevent from 
exploiting these security threats from inside the network. These findings supported the idea of 
client’s NAC implementation, because if the network is trusted, the devices in the network are 
also trusted. The goal was to develop methods and techniques how a single computer could 
execute the conclusion about the connected network. This included developing the basic 
architecture of the client’s NAC solution and discovering different authentication methods for 
authenticating the network. These authentication methods were analyzed with security and 
implementation analysis and based on these analyzes the thesis recommends certain 
authentication methods for client to authenticate the connected network. 
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Tiivistelmä  
Työn tavoitteena oli kehittää uutta ideologiaa ja tekniikoita (client’s NAC), jossa perinteinen 
verkkolähtöinen näkökulma pääsynhallinnassa suunnataan yksittäiselle tietokoneelle. Tämän 
kaltaista tutkimusta tai konseptia ei ollut olemassa, joten kyseessä oli aivan uusi tutkimuksen 
aihe. Kehittämisessä lähtökohtana oli löytää malli, jonka mukaan yksittäinen tietokone pystyy 
päättelemään, onko verkko, johon se on kytketty, luotettu vai ei. Työssä sovellettiin ja 
analysointiin eri autentikointivaihtoehtoja, joiden perusteella esitettiin tiettyjä 
autentikointitekniikoita client’s NAC -sovelluksen toteuttamiseen.    
 
Työ osoitti, että yleisimmissä LAN-protokollissa on merkittäviä uhkia ja haavoittuvuuksia. Jos 
yksittäinen tietokone kykenee päättelemään verkon luottavuuden, näiden uhkien toteutumista 
voidaan lieventää, sillä luotettava verkko sisältää vain luotettuja laitteita. Tämä vahvisti, että 
client’s NAC -konseptin avulla voidaan suojautua epäluotettavien laitteiden haitalliselta 
tietoliikenteeltä.  
 
Eri autentikointimallit jaettiin työssä kahteen eri kategoriaan tulevan kohdeympäristön 
perusteella. Korkean tietoturvallisuuden ympäristöissä tietoturva ja osapuolten luottavuus on 
tärkein tekijä suunniteltaessa autentikointimalleja, kun taas matalamman tietoturvaluokan 
ympäristöihin toteutuksen helppous ja käytettävyys ratkaisee valinnassa.  
 
Analysointi eri autentikointimallien välillä suoritettiin tietoturva-analyysillä, joka perustui 
tietoturvaprotokollissa oleviin yleisimpiin haavoittuvuuksiin, ja toteutusanalyysillä, jossa 
pyrittiin tekemään päätelmiä toteutuksen toimivuudesta ja vaikeudesta. Näiden analyysien 
perusteella työ esittää eri vaihtoehtoja eri ympäristöihin toteutettavaksi autentikointitavaksi 
client’s NAC -sovellukseen. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of networks has increased and also vulnerabilities in IP networks have 
become more hazardous. For example, a case on the vulnerability in Internet Domain 
Name System service (DNS cache poisoning) was published in summer 2008. This 
was a very serious case of vulnerability which could deceive a user to a wrong URL 
with keying forged information to client’s resolver’s cache. Fortunately, DNS cache 
poisoning got plenty of publicity in information security forums; therefore software 
were rapidly updated to a more secure version. The exploitation of this vulnerability 
was not extensive. Another significant network related vulnerability was recently 
(September 2008) noticed in TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) protocol stack. 
This vulnerability is based on fulfilling the destination’s TCP connection queue with 
hostile packets. These actions cause DOS (Denial of Service) attack in the 
destination’s network. So what makes this TCP vulnerability so hazardous? 
Vulnerability is a feature on TCP implementation and the utilization of TCP protocol 
is enormous. Almost every solution uses TCP protocol for creating and maintaining 
connections in IP networks.       
Vulnerabilities would not be so big problem if there were not anyone who exploits 
these security holes. In the beginning of the Internet the threats came from random 
script kiddies and hackers. They were eager to prove their abilities to each other and 
show that they could get away with it. Today, highly motivated and well-financed 
organized crime is taking advantage of vulnerabilities and security holes in computer 
systems in the Internet. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities are not their only target. For 
example phishing and social engineering have become more common in these days in 
the Internet.  
The Internet does not obey country boundaries; it spans and connects the globe. 
Different countries have different laws. There are no common laws or authority which 
could actually protect anyone or anything in the Internet; therefore it is impossible to 
root out organized crime. Well-designed, automated, well-funded remote attacks are 
constantly being launched for getting financial benefits and for the remote control 
computers creating botnets, which are used to infect other computers and launching 
distributed denial-of-service attacks.  
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Many organizations have lost control of their own assets, and may not have 
knowledge what is really happening in their networks. Organizations can not just wait 
for news of the new hazardous vulnerability or attack. Data security risks and threats 
have to be identified and managed. IT management strategy, governance, risk 
management and compliance are corner stones to get control of IT infrastructure.  
Network Access Control (NAC) is a concept which focuses on GRC (Governance, 
Risk management, Compliance). As the name indicates, it concentrates on who or 
what is gaining access to network. Because NAC is a new technology, people have a 
different impression of the definition. Some might think that IEEE 802.1X port based 
authentication is a NAC or certain software product is NAC.  
Network access control is a framework, which involves different products; NAC 
consists of a cluster of new and present technologies which control what device or 
who can get access to a protected network. NAC can restrict network access based on 
user authentication, device authentication and device attributes which are defined on 
certain policy, for example these attributes can be antivirus signature level and 
operating system patch level. If these attributes are not equal to policy, the device is 
guided to quarantine. (Reinhold, 8, 9, 13.) 
NAC handles protection from the network’s point of view, which means that the 
network does not trust devices which are connected to it, until certain validations are 
done and passed. How about it if your organization has several different networks 
which are in different security levels? Some networks can be organization’s 
maintaining responsibility, and maintenance of some of those networks may be 
outsourced to a third party.  
What happens if NAC is not used in every each of those networks, and somebody 
connects the highest security level PC to an untrusted network? What kind of data 
does the computer send to that network?  Is there a process or a product how single 
computer could validate is the network trusted or not?  
Network Access Control is a concept which contains different kinds of technologies 
and policies. The main idea is that these technologies are in the trusted network and 
with these technologies and policies the network validates the devices trying to access 
its recourses. If these devices correspond to the current policies, access is granted. In a 
nutshell, the philosophy of the Network Access Control is that all devices requesting 
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accesses to network’s resources are untrusted until are otherwise proved. Could we 
conduct the same kind of philosophy to a single computer? A computer does not trust 
the network before it has done specific validations from the network. When these 
validations are done, depending on the outcome of the validations, network traffic to a 
network is allowed or denied. Information security is basically based on trust. In this 
case trust is the ability for a computer to be reasonably assured that a particular 
network has known devices and these devices meet the security requirements that the 
organization has agreed on. It is always safe to start a network connection from a state 
in which both participants do not trust each other. There are no products on the 
commercial markets which have certain functionality to validate networks and are 
based on client’s mistrust. In this thesis this product is called client’s NAC. The actual 
NAC framework has been developed for different purposes, but together these 
solutions (NAC and the client’s NAC) complement each other. Client’s NAC brings 
one security layer more to overall security. It completes other client security products, 
such as personal firewall, antivirus software and most important; it completes 
Network Access Control concept. 
Purpose of this research is to investigate is it possible to mitigate the security threats 
which arise when the workstation is connected to an untrusted network. Different 
types of network traffic are examined and the security threats are identified. The goal 
is to find most common local area network protocols (Windows network) and 
applications that generate the traffic that should be secured from untrusted devices. 
Security threats of these protocols are investigated and presented. In this research the 
objective is discover new authentication methods which are conducted from common 
network protocols or security protocols and introduce how these protocols could be 
applied in client’s NAC solution. 
This study presents research work concentrating in:  
 Discovering Windows client’s common LAN traffic/protocols and security 
threats of these protocols   
 Techniques, methods and ideas how to control the client’s joining to the 
network  
 Comparison of different ideas of developing client’s NAC authentication 
methods (security and implementation analysis) 
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 Choosing the best techniques and components how to develop client’s NAC 
authentication and introduction of the basic architecture of a client’s NAC 
 
2 NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
2.1 History of the term 
The term NAC was launched by the Cisco Systems in year 2003. It was a part of self-
defense aware networks marketing architecture. At that time, the meaning of the 
NAC-term was Network Admission Control. The main idea was to grant access for 
network equipment to network after their health had been inspected.  
An accelerator for developing NAC was malware such as Blaster and SQL slammer 
which could independently spread in IP-networks. They were caused unpleasant 
problems all over the world, including many Finnish organizations. For example in 
October 2003, Nordea had to close 80 customer service offices because Blaster based 
Lovsan virus spread in their IP-networks. (Työasemat tarkastukseen 2008, 52.) 
2.2 Network protection in the old days 
Organizations usually protect their network’s perimeter with proper firewalls and 
email malware scanners. This is a standard way to protect network from outside 
threats, but this procedure does not take into consideration inside threats such as 
infected laptops or other network equipments which are brought inside the network. 
For instance, laptop can spread malware’s for hours in network before the source of 
the spreader has been discovered. Even though if information security programs were 
centrally updated, the time between logon to network and when client (workstation) 
update itself is creating a vulnerability window. Usually this time can be hours or even 
days.  
Workstation health has many dimensions. Important markers are (Reinhold, 6-7.): 
 Absence of malware 
 Updated malware prevention tools 
  Patch management 
  Specific firewall settings  
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 Corporate security policy –based configurations  
2.3 NAC fundamentals  
NAC works by checking workstations’ utility programs and security software that 
they are up to date and equal to organization’s information security policy. If these 
components meet the information security policy and are also updated, the 
workstation is granted normal access to the network. Otherwise workstation is 
connected to separate segment in the network which is called a quarantine segment. In 
this quarantine segment, the workstation is updated to a proper level. After the 
updating process, the workstation is granted normal access to the network.  
After Cisco Systems launched their Network Admission Control, the concept was so 
good so that many rivals came to market with their own thinner and less device 
manufacturer dependent systems. The NAC-term got its new meaning - Network 
Access Control. Heated competition in the markets produced incompatible solutions. 
This situation did was not win customer’s confidence. NAC stayed years as a big 
promise, the development of which potential customers were watching from distance.  
TCG group (Trusted Computing Group) which is group of a computer and network 
manufacturers, has made standardization work for NAC. This group includes 
manufactures such as Juniper Networks, Microsoft and Extreme Networks. Juniper 
Networks has an imposing role of NAC standardization.  
TCG’s vision of NAC is TNC – Trusted Network Connect, which has a full set of 
open standards for network access control. The main goal is to develop a set of open 
standards so that different manufacturers’ workstation, network and server 
components can interoperate. (Työasemat tarkastukseen 2008, 53.) 
2.4 Server and domain isolation 
Microsoft has implemented their own techniques to achieve a logical security layer to 
the network.  Microsoft calls these techniques “Server and domain isolation”. The 
basic idea of Server and domain isolation is that there is no need for certain equipment 
architecture such as e.g. in 802.1X. Server and domain isolation uses Windows 
computers, servers, Active Directory group policies and IPSec technologies to create a 
layer of security to achieve logical isolation of the network traffic that moves between 
computers or networks. As most of the companies already have Windows 
environment (total market share of Windows computers 15.5.2009 is 87.9%, 
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Operating System Market Share 2009), the deployment of these techniques does not 
necessarily need further investments.  
Server and domain isolation mitigates the risk of internal attackers. Even though an 
attacker has a physical access to an organization’s internal network and uses a valid 
user account/password, an attacker cannot get access to servers. This is result from 
trusted device ideology. (Server and Domain Isolation Using IPSec and Group Policy 
2006, 1.) 
2.5 Security threats which NAC is not taking care of 
NAC is a concept for protecting the networks from unwanted access, but there are 
some threats that NAC does not handle at all. This thesis concentrates on ways to 
mitigate these threats.  
If a computer is accidentally or intentionally connected to a wrong network, computer 
sends information about itself to that network. In many cases this information is an IP-
address, operating system version, computer name, and domain name etc. The 
information depends on computer’s operating system. With this information it is 
possible to make conclusions about the computer’s network infrastructure such as IP-
address spaces, name services, domain controllers and operating system 
vulnerabilities. This kind of information can be used for hostile purposes.  
What if a laptop is left in a conference room because of a lunch break and the 
username is locked? Someone could connect to the laptop’s network interface 
eavesdropping equipment and could capture information from the laptop.  
These examples are security threats which have to be prevented; therefore we have to 
implement a new solution to do this because there are no commercial solutions on the 
markets.   
2.6 Discovering the client’s outbound network traffic 
Computer sends different kinds of data to a network when it is connected. The data 
can be basically divided into two categories: There is data which is automatically sent 
towards network and data which is sent after certain user actions.  
The sent data depends on the operating system. This thesis concentrates on Microsoft 
Windows XP operating system. When Windows XP workstation is connected to a 
network it sends information about itself to network. The sent information depends on 
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the computer’s network settings. For example, there can be a static IP-address or 
DHCP setting, NBT (NetBIOS over TCP/IP) setting and the computer can be attached 
to Windows domain or workgroup. The data can vary depending on network settings.  
In next two chapters (3 and 4) the most interesting network protocols from security 
and authentication perspective are presented. A computer uses many network 
protocols when it sends traffic towards network, but the protocols for further 
examination have been chosen based on their commonness in Windows networks. In 
addition, the thesis examined what security threats these protocols have and how these 
threats can be addressed or mitigated. 
The method that was to discover the interesting network traffic was first to capture 
computer’s real traffic and analyze it, followed by orientation with literature about 
these protocols. The traffic was analyzed from authentication and security perspective 
and the objective was to find how these protocols can be utilized to authenticate the 
trusted network. The traffic tests were done in a test environment which had three 
Windows XP workstations, two Windows 2003 servers, a router and a LAN switch.  
 
3 CLIENT’S NETBIOS OVER TCP/IP TRAFFIC 
3.1  NetBIOS and NBT 
NetBIOS (Network Basic Input/Output System) was developed in 1983 for IBM PC-
networking. The design objectives were to build a small and fast protocol that would 
allow human readable names for devices, such as “OfficeComputer”. It is easier to 
remember names than a complex numbering scheme. NetBIOS is not a protocol; it is 
an API (Application programming interface) for PCs to access LAN facilities. In that 
time there were limitations in the size of networks, size of network was no more than 
72 devices on broadband access. 
Because NetBIOS is an interface rather than a protocol, it requires a network protocol 
to carry its sessions across a network. At first network protocol was NetBEUI 
(NetBIOS Extended User Interface).  This protocol operates over LAN using OSI 
layer 2, therefore it is not routed protocol. Because of this limitation and its nature to 
use broadcast traffic, there was a need to discover new methods to use NetBIOS in 
networks. (Haden 1996.)    
12 
NetBIOS over TCP/IP also called NBT (or NetBT) was published in RFC 1001 in 
March 1987. RFC defined NetBIOS encapsulation method in TCP and UDP packets. 
In other words NBT is an implementation of the NetBIOS API on top of TCP/IP. NBT 
provides three services:  
- NetBIOS name service 
- Datagram service  
- Session service.  
The Name Service handles NetBIOS names and is used to do name resolution; name 
service is at UDP port 137. The Datagram Services and Session Services are mainly 
used for protocols based on Server Message Block (SMB). These two communication 
services are used to transmit data between NetBIOS computers across the network. 
(Ts J, Eckstein R, & Collier-Brown D 2003, 10.) Datagram service is at UDP port 138 
and Session service is at TCP port 139 (Zwicky E. D, Cooper S, Chapman B D 2000, 
359). 
3.2  NetBIOS name service  
16 bytes long NetBIOS name identifies a computer or group of computers in the 
network. There are two types of NetBIOS names; name is either a unique (exclusive) 
or group (non-exclusive). NetBIOS applications typically use unique names when 
communicating with a specific process on a computer, and group names are used to 
communicating with multiple computers at a time. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for 
Microsoft Windows 2005.) Only one node can have certain unique name, but any 
number of nodes can have a group name. The name has to be owned by at least one 
node otherwise it ceases to exist. (RFC 1001 1987.) 
An example of a service that uses a NetBIOS name is “The File and Printer Sharing” 
over Microsoft Networks component (also called Server service). For a start the 
Server service registers a unique NetBIOS name based on the computer name. The 
NetBIOS name is the 15-byte computer name plus a sixteenth byte of 0x20. Because 
each character is 8 bits long, it means that NetBIOS name can be only 15 characters. 
The last character is reserved as a special character. Windows appends spaces to 
computer name if it is shorter than 15 bytes long. On the contrary, the names longer 
than 15 bytes are truncated. The sixteenth byte of the NetBIOS name typically 
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identifies a specific service. The client for Microsoft Networks component (also called 
Workstation service) and the Messenger service uses NetBIOS. The Workstation 
service has sixteenth byte of 0x00 and the Messenger service has a sixteenth byte of 
0x03. Figure 1 shows how NetBIOS names differ between services. (TCP/IP 
Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 2005.) 
 
FIGURE 1. NBT and NetBIOS applications (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft 
Windows 2005) 
 When user in Windows network connects to a shared folder with a “net use” 
command or with Windows Explorer, NBT resolves the NetBIOS name for the Server 
service of the specified computer. After resolving the IPv4 address of the NetBIOS 
name, the Workstation service on the client computer can start communication with 
the Server service on the destination computer. 
Services such as the Computer Browser, Distributed File System, and Net Logon 
services are dependent on Server, Workstation, and Messenger services. This means 
that these services also register NetBIOS names. Accessing to these services Windows 
network applications must use their corresponding NetBIOS names. One example is 
Computer Browser service which collects and distributes the list of workgroups and 
domains. These lists are constructed of NetBIOS names. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for 
Microsoft Windows 2005.) 
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3.3 NetBIOS end-nodes 
 
NetBIOS implementation has three types of end-nodes. These nodes support NetBIOS 
interface and have applications which use NetBIOS API. Three types of end-nodes are 
part of NetBIOS standard (RFC 1001 1987.): 
-  Broadcast ("B") nodes 
-  Point-to-point ("P") nodes 
-  Mixed mode ("M") nodes 
 
Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP support five NetBIOS node types: the node 
types defined in RFC 1001 and also Windows specific node types. Each node type 
resolves NetBIOS names differently. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 
2005.) 
Broadcast node (B-node) uses broadcasts for name registration and resolution. 
Broadcasts are flooded inside broadcast domain, which means that NetBIOS resources 
that are located on different IP subnets cannot be resolved. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for 
Microsoft Windows 2005.) In other words, the broadcast area is a single MAC-
bridged “B-LAN”. Broadcast nodes use a mix of UDP datagrams (both broadcast and 
directed) and TCP connections to communicate with each other. (RFC 1001 1987.) 
Point-to-point nodes (P) use an NBNS (NetBIOS name server) such as WINS to 
resolve NetBIOS names. P-node queries the NBNS using only directed UDP 
datagrams and TCP sessions, this means that P-nodes can resolve NetBIOS resources 
located on remote subnets. P nodes cannot generate or listen for broadcast UDP 
packets. Therefore NetBIOS name resolution fails for all NetBIOS names if the 
NBNS becomes unavailable, even for NetBIOS applications that are in the same 
subnet. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 2005.) However, using 
capabilities provided by the NBNS and NetBIOS Datagram Distribution Server 
(NBDD) P-nodes can use NetBIOS level broadcast and multicast services, in this case 
NBNS and NBDD have to be available. An end-node can query an NBDD to 
determine if the NBDD is willing to relay a datagram to a specific NetBIOS name. P 
nodes lean on NetBIOS name and datagram distribution servers. The servers’ being 
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local or remote does not affect the functionality of P-node; they operate the same in 
either case.   
Mixed mode nodes (or "M") are a combination of B-node and P-node. M nodes use 
both broadcast and unicast. To improve response time, broadcast is a default method 
because of the assumption that most resources reside on the local broadcast medium 
rather than somewhere in an internet. If the broadcast name query fails, NBT uses an 
NBNS. M-nodes are also dependent on NBNS and NBDD servers. If servers become 
unavailable, M-nodes can continue with limited functionality. (RFC 1001 1987.) 
There are also two Windows specific node types which are not described in RFC 
1001. These node types are:  
- H-node (hybrid) is a combination of P-node and B-node. This node type 
functions as a P-node by default. If the unicast name query fails to the NBNS, 
the node uses a broadcast. 
- Microsoft enhanced B-node is a combination of B-node and the use of the 
local Lmhosts file. If the broadcast name query fails, the node checks the local 
Lmhosts file. 
3.4 NetBIOS name registration, resolution, and release 
NBT network resources use processes for name registration, name resolution, and 
name release to manage NetBIOS names. 
3.4.1 Name registration 
NBT hosts registers its NetBIOS names using a NetBIOS Name Registration Request 
message (name claim). It also maintains name information which it has been 
registered. This information includes: 
- Whether the name is a group or unique name 
- Whether the name is "in conflict" 
- Whether the name is in the process of being deleted  
 
Registration can be made via broadcast message to local subnet or a unicast message 
to a NetBIOS name server (NBNS). In a name conflict situation either the host that 
previously registered the name or the NBNS responds with a negative name 
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registration response. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 2005.) Every 
node has a permanent unique name, which must be explicitly registered by all end-
node types (RFC 1001 1987).     
3.4.2 Name resolution 
A NetBIOS name is a Session layer application identifier. The process of mapping a 
NetBIOS name to an IPv4 address is known as NetBIOS name resolution or name 
query. Name query is needed for example during session establishment where source 
and destination names must be specified. The name can be a unique or group name. If 
the destination name is a group name, a datagram is sent to all the members of that 
group. (RFC 1001 1987.)   
In Windows networks NetBIOS name resolution functions same way that is described 
in RFC 1001. NetBIOS application running in Windows XP or Windows 2003 server 
broadcasts a NetBIOS Name Query Request message to local subnet or uses a direct 
query to NBNS. NetBIOS Name Query Request message contains the NetBIOS name 
of the destination host.   
In NetBIOS name conflicting situation the neighboring host that has registered the 
same NetBIOS name or an NBNS responds by sending a negative NetBIOS Name 
Query Response message. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 2005.) 
3.4.3 Name release 
When NetBIOS application is stopped name release occurs. B-nodes release a name 
by broadcasting a notice to local subnet. P-nodes send a direct notification to their 
NBNS. M-nodes both broadcast a notice and send notification to their NBNS. (RFC 
1001 1987.) For example, if Workstation service on a Windows host is stopped, the 
host requests that the NBNS no longer respond to queries for the Workstation service 
name (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 2005). This is an explicit 
release. NetBIOS name release can also be silent. When end-node fails or is turned off 
this release typically occurs. (RFC 1001 1987.)  After NetBIOS name is released, it is 
available for use by another host (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 
2005).  
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3.5 NetBIOS Scope ID 
The NetBIOS scope ID segments NetBIOS Names. “Scope” isolates a set of NBT 
nodes and ID is “tagged” to NetBIOS name as character string. If the ID on two hosts 
does not match, they will not be able to communicate to each other with NBT. Scope 
ID is a part of the full NetBIOS name. (TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows 
2005.) By default scope ID is an empty string. This ID can be modified from 
Windows registry.  
RFC 1001 recommends that both B and M nodes should not be used within the same 
scope. The scope should contain only P and M nodes or B nodes. (RFC 1001 1987.)     
3.6 Security threats in NBT  
NetBIOS over TCP/IP ports are UDP 137, UDP 138, and TCP 139. Unfortunately 
NBT provides poor security. Hosts can initiate connections to each other with 
NetBIOS names. NBT application could do authorization based on sender’s NetBIOS 
name and IP address but in practice this is very rare. Even though there is an 
authorization, IP addresses and NetBIOS names are easy to spoof. Attackers use port 
scanners or passive sensors to sniff NBT ports because of their poor security. NBT 
offers diagnostics tools such as nbtstat, this tool is very handful to an attacker, who 
can use the tool to begin footprinting. Once an attacker discovers an active port 139 on 
a device, with the nbtstat command, he can obtain significant information about the 
target computer and network. That information includes (Olzak 2007.): 
 Computer name 
 Contents of the remote name cache, including IP addresses 
 A list of local NetBIOS names 
 A list of names resolved by broadcast or via WINS 
 Contents of the session table with the destination IP addresses  
 
Mostly the attacker searches information about the OS, services, shares, user IDs and 
major applications running on the system. With nbtstat command this information is 
visible for a cracker. For example, IPC$ share was a few years ago common target to 
crackers. The following chapter discusses this share and exploits it in more detail.   
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3.6.1 The IPC$ share 
IPC (Inter-Process Communication) share is simply a regular share with an interesting 
behavior added to it. On Windows NT architecture, any shared directory can be made 
into a null-session share. Null-session means that other computers to access the share 
without user-based connection data (username, password). (Configuring Null-Session 
Shares 1999.)   
3.6.2 How crackers abused null shares? 
First, they had to find out with a port scanner which computer has a TCP 139 port 
open. When this was done they started to footprinting the computer if the IPC$ share 
was available.  
When successful footprinting is done, there are several Windows command line 
commands such as NET commands which can be used to find and map shares on 
remote computers. To initiate a null session to remote computers IPC share can be 
made with following NET command: C:\>NET USE \\TARGET\IPC$ "" /USER:"". 
Cracker connects to IPC share on the specified target with the password “” and the 
user name “”. The next step in the cracking process was to try to get access to the 
Windows NT hidden shares. The default hidden shares are: C$, PRINT$, ADMIN$, 
IPC$. The “$” sign makes these shares invisible to the average users. If a cracker gets 
access to remote computer’s C$ share with administrators privileges, he or she can 
have full control of the computer. (IPC share exploit.) 
These IPC null session attacks were easy to implement because attacker did not need 
to have programming skills, only command line usage was needed. Most of the cases 
cracker needed an administrator password before he or she got access to C$ share. 
This only slightly delayed the attack because getting the administrator’s password 
from remote computer was also quite easy. On the Internet there are several software 
and methods such as brute force to crack a Windows administrator’s password. This 
null session attack is just one example of the vulnerability history of NBT. Nowadays, 
null session attacks are rare, because this vulnerability is well known and there are 
many ways to prevent null sessions. Information security threats were different when 
NetBIOS and NBT were implemented than nowadays. There are different methods to 
prevent security threats that NBT brings but the fact is that NBT is still unsecure, 
because security aspects were not taken consideration in the design phase of the 
NetBIOS.     
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3.7 Disabling NetBIOS 
NetBIOS offers an easy way to browse network resources and share directories or 
files in a computer network. It has different services such as name service which for 
example mitigates browsing and sharing. NetBT is a very common implementation in 
Windows Networks, because Microsoft adopted NetBIOS for their products in the 
1980s and many corporate networks can still have legacy Windows operating systems 
(Windows 9x, Windows NT) or other applications which need the NetBIOS API to 
run. That is why NBT is turned on by default in newer operating systems such as 
Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and Windows Vista. (Tulloch 
2004.) 
During the last ten years there have been many exploits in NBT. The Redbutton attack 
was one of the common exploits which utilized the NetBIOS session service. This 
technique was based on the TCP/IP connection to port 139. With this connection, a 
cracker could establish a null session share. The null session share made it possible to 
access the Windows NT hidden shares and gain administrator privileges on a target 
computer. (How is information enumerated through NULL session access, Remote 
Procedure Calls and IPC$? 1999.) It is generally noticed among the IT professionals 
that NBT processes are unsecure.  
 For better security, Microsoft had implemented DNS to be the default name 
resolution method for Windows 2000 and for newer operating systems. This means 
that on pure Windows-2000/XP/2003 networks NetBIOS is no needed. Because of the 
NBT’s unsecure nature, what is the point of leaving NetBIOS enabled on this kind of 
network?  
Active Directory installation to Windows 2000 server or Windows 2003 server 
automatically suggests and accepts NetBIOS name for Windows domain. This cannot 
be overridden. Even though DNS is default name resolution, Windows 2000/2003 
server is forced to use NetBIOS name for the domain. The persistence of NetBIOS 
names is not just for the need of legacy; Windows NT domains participates fully in 
Windows 2000/2003 forests. NetBIOS support is required for establishing Windows 
domain trusts, even though there is only pure Windows 2000/2003 domain. Active 
Directory forests must have unique NetBIOS names in order for name resolution to 
work properly and support access to resources across forest boundaries. (Tulloch 
2004.) 
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This means that NBT cannot be fully switched off from pure Windows 2000/2003 
networks. Because NetBIOS has so deep integration to Windows networks and most 
Windows computers need it, the unsecure NBT traffic has to be handled in another 
way. If NBT cannot be switched off from computer’s network settings, we must be 
sure that the network is trusted where computer sends its NBT traffic. The Client’s 
NAC is addressing this problem.  
 
4 DHCP AND DNS TRAFFIC AND THEIR SECURITY 
ISSUES  
4.1 DHCP traffic 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a common service in IP networks. 
DHCP is a network application protocol used by devices (DHCP clients) to obtain 
network configuration parameters that they need in order to operate. These parameters 
include e.g: IP-address, subnet mask, default-gateway, DNS server IP-address and 
possible other server addresses.  This protocol allows devices to be connected to the 
network with little or no manual configuration. DHCP is based on a client-server 
model, where DHCP servers allocate network addresses and deliver configuration 
parameters to clients who are configured to use DHCP. (RFC 2131 1997.) 
DHCP is defined in RFC 2131 which was released in 1997. This definition is the 
current DHCP definition for IPv4 networks. The extensions of DHCP for IPv6 
(DHCPv6) were published as RFC 3315. DHCP consists of two components:  
 Delivering protocol for configuration parameters to client (network-aware 
device) from a DHCP server.  
 A mechanism for allocation of network settings to clients. 
DHCP has three network settings allocation mechanisms:  
1. In automatic allocation server assigns a permanent IP address to a client. 
Server has a table of past IP address assignments, so that the server can assign 
to a client the same network settings that the client previously had. 
2. In dynamic allocation, server assigns an IP address to a client which has a 
limited lease period.  
21 
3. In manual allocation, IP address to a client is assigned by the network 
administrators, who are manually keying MAC address and IP address pairs to 
DHCP server. The client whose MAC address is listed in the table will be 
allocated corresponding IP address of the table.  
DHCP uses UDP as its transport protocol.  DHCP server listens for UDP port 67 and 
client listens for UDP port 68. The “server identifier” field in the DHCP message is 
used to identify a DHCP server and value of the field directs client’s unicast traffic to 
the right server. 
Successful DHCP conversation is divided into four basic messages. These messages 
are DHCPDISCOVERY, DHCPOFFER, DHCPREQUEST, and DHCPACK (IP lease 
acknowledgement). When the client has received the network settings (IP address, 
subnet mask, default gateway and DNS etc), it uses an address resolution protocol 
(ARP) query to prevent IP conflicts in case of address pool overlapping of DHCP 
servers. Below is a detailed description about the basic DHCP messages used in 
DHCP conversation: 
The client starts the conversation by sending DHCPDISCOVERY message to 
destination of 255.255.255.255 or subnet broadcast address. Because this message is a 
broadcast message, it is not routed. Therefore if DHCP server is in another subnet, 
each subnet where the server is not located needs a BOOTP relay agent (also called 
DHCP relay agent) which forwards discover messages to the server. For instance, this 
relay agent can be a local router which is configured to forward DHCP packets to a 
DHCP server on a different subnet. (RFC 2131 1997.) A client can request its 
preceding IP address and lease duration from server by including in DHCP discover 
message its former IP address. These attributes are placed in DHCP options field in 
DHCP message. If the network is corresponding with the parameters that the client 
offered, the server might grant the request. (RFC 1533 1993.) 
After the client has sent the DHCPDISCOVERY request to a server, the server 
reserves an IP address for client by sending a DHCPOFFER message. The message 
includes offered network address in the “yiaddr” field, client's MAC address in the 
“chaddr” field. Other configuration parameters such as: the subnet mask, the lease 
duration, DNS server addresses and NetBIOS settings etc. are located in DHCP 
options field.  
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The DHCPOFFER message can come via one or several servers to the client. This 
means that the client can receive multiple offers. Based on the configuration 
parameters offered in the DHCPOFFER message, the client chooses one server where 
to request configuration parameters. When the client has chosen the server, it 
broadcasts a DHCPREQUEST message which contains the “server identifier” in 
options field to indicate the chosen server. The “requested IP address” option value is 
same as the value of “yiaddr” field in the DHCPOFFER message from the server. 
Because the request message is broadcast, it is forwarded same way as the discovery 
message; through DHCP/BOOTP relay agents. The value of the “secs” field in the 
original discover message is copied to request message’s “secs” field. This field and 
the same broadcast address that was in the original discover messages are the factors 
which direct request messages to the same set of servers that received the original 
DHCPDISCOVER message. 
The servers withdraw offers and return the offered address to the pool of available 
addresses if they do not match the value in the “server identifier” field of the 
DHCPREQUEST message. The selected server reserves from its address pool the IP 
address and respond with DHCPACK message which includes the network 
parameters for the client. The combination of the “client identifier” or “chaddr” (these 
fields includes host’s MAC address value) fields and the assigned IP address create 
unique identifier for the client's lease. With this identifier client and server identify a 
lease referred to in any DHCP messages. DHCPACK message’s “yiaddr'” field is 
filled in with the selected IP address. (RFC 2131 1997.) 
The four DHCP messages that were described above are the main messages when a 
client receives network parameters from the server successfully. There are also other 
messages which are briefly described as follows. The messages are:   
DHCPNAK is message from a server to a client indicating that a network address is 
incorrect or the client's lease has expired. The selected server sends to client 
DHCPNAK message after it has received DHCPREQUEST message and is unable to 
satisfy the client demands.  
The client indicates the server with DHCPDECLINE message that the network 
address is already in use. After the client has sent the message it restarts the 
configuration process.  The client waits at least ten seconds before it restarts the 
configuration process to avoid massive network traffic in case of looping. 
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The client sends to server DHCPRELEASE message when it wants to abandon its 
network address and cancel the remaining lease. The released lease is identified in this 
message with its “client identifier” field or in “chaddr” field and network address. If 
the client wants to retain its network address, it will not abandon its lease during the 
shutdown or reboot.  
If a client has manually configured network address, it can use a DHCPINFORM 
request message (clients IP-address is in messages “ciaddr” field) to obtain other 
configuration parameters. After the servers have received the message they send a 
DHCPACK message with configuration parameters. The server does not allocate a 
new address, it is not checking for an existing binding and it does not fill the “yiaddr” 
field or adds the lease time parameters. The server checks the network address in a 
DHCPINFORM message for consistency. (RFC 2131 1997.) 
4.1.1 Security threats in DHCP 
DHCP is based on BOOTP which was implemented in 1980s when the Internet was in 
its early stage. The Internet was only a small group of research and educational 
organizations using TCP/IP networks interconnecting universities and other research 
organizations. Because of the small amount of users there were few security threats 
and therefore security was not baseline for the designing of new protocols. As a result, 
when designing DHCP and many other protocols in 1980s and in the early 1990s, 
designers did not take security aspects into consideration. 
DCHP traffic is unencrypted and the authentication methods are based on IP-
addresses and MAC-addresses which are easy to forge. DHCP has poor security and it 
is not an improving fact that DHCP runs over IP and UDP which are inherently 
insecure.  In modern networks and the Internet this causes potential security issues. 
DHCP messages contain information about host’s network configuration parameters 
and therefore the protocol can be used to hostile purposes. Because both the client and 
the server can send DHCP messages including configuration parameters, the security 
issues are divided into two classes:   
 Unauthorized DHCP Servers: Installing a “rogue” DHCP server, it can 
respond to client requests and offer them forged configuration information. 
This could isolate clients from a network or set them ready for further abuse 
later on. For example, a cracker could install a forged DHCP server which 
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offers forged DNS server information for DHCP client. This DNS server is 
under cracker’s control and it can direct client computer to forged web-pages 
which install different kinds of malware to the computer. For instance, this 
computer can be then used in botnets or cover other cracking trails.   
 Unauthorized DHCP Clients: Because MAC addresses are easy to forge, the 
client could be configured to act as a legitimate DHCP client and obtain 
configuration parameters from a server. With this information a cracker can 
compromise the network later on. Software which generates forged client 
requests can be used to create DOS attack by using up all the IP addresses in a 
DHCP server's pool. This could be also used in stealing purposes. A cracker 
can steal an IP address for own use.  
These are serious security threats in DHCP, so how can we add security to DHCP? 
One solution is to put effort on security at lower layers. Controlling the physical 
access of the network is an important technique to prevent an unauthorized host to get 
access to the network. This can be done for example, with MAC address lists on LAN 
switches or implementing and deploying 802.1X infrastructure to network. The 
second alternative is IPSec which provides authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality for data transfer. Because IPSec provides strong authentication 
methods, thereby it is a potential option to address security problems in DHCP.  
These examples add security to DHCP but there are also problems in these methods. 
MAC address lists in LAN switches are very arduous to maintain, if hosts change their 
places in network topology. 802.1X needs a certain infrastructure to work and it takes 
time to deploy it to large networks. Hosts need IP-addresses before they can use IPSec 
services. This means that they have to use DHCP services first that they can receive 
network configuration parameters. With IPSec network administrators can prevent 
unauthorized clients from getting access to network servers, but it cannot prevent 
rogue DHCP servers. (Kozierok 2001.)  
4.2 DNS  
Like DHCP, Domain Name System (DNS) is based on a client-server model. It is a 
distributed database which contains information about domain names, host names and 
their IP addresses. Basically DNS is translating hostnames to IP addresses and vice 
versa. DNS was implemented in 1984, because host files which earlier handled 
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hostname - IP address mappings grew too large and maintaining of these host files 
was a huge problem. Maintaining and updating was difficult because there was no 
centralized management over host files. Each host file was updated independently. 
The result was that the host files were never up to date. DNS which had centralized 
management and distributed database was answer to these problems.  
Paul Mockapetris was responsible for designing the new system, and he released in 
1984 RFCs 882 and 883 which described the new system; DNS. Several updates have 
been published for these RFCs. RFCs 1034 and 1035 are the current specifications of 
Domain Name System. 
Programs called nameservers are the server half of the client/server model. 
Nameservers have files which are called “zone files”. These files have information 
about certain domain or domains and their computer – IP address mappings. The 
information which is in zone files is called Resource Records (RR). The Client in 
DNS is resolver and they are used to send queries to nameservers. These queries are 
sent to port UDP 53. Because DNS is distributed database, nameservers can send zone 
files to each other. The primary nameserver informs the secondary nameserver that 
zone file information has changed and the secondary nameserver fetches the new 
information by connecting to TCP port 53. So, in Domain Name System servers use 
TCP traffic and the client use UDP traffic. (Albitz & Liu 2006, 9, 22.) 
4.2.1 Security threats in DNS 
Humans have difficulties to remember IP addresses (IPv4) because they consist of 12 
digits. Names are much easier to remember and therefore DNS is one of the most 
important services in computer networks. Like DHCP the DNS was implemented in 
1980s and the specifications did not have weight on security issues.  
When DNS was implemented the trend was to use in IP based applications IP 
addresses and host names as a basis for allowing or disallowing access. For example 
UNIX programs like rlogin and rsh used host names for authentication. A user could 
authenticate himself without entering password from trusted hosts. Compromising 
organization's domain name server made a possible to masquerade an untrusted host 
as a trusted system and connect to UNIX servers. There were also other protocols 
which evolved with similar authentication methods, such as Network File System 
(NFS), X windows, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), etc. 
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DNS protocol has not got any restrictions who can query resource records from 
nameservers. DNS is designed to be a public database and the concept was not to limit 
access to information within the DNS name space. Later versions of the BIND which 
is one implementation of nameserver program support certain access control features. 
These features include for example, restriction of zone transfers. Although there are 
some access control features in the nameserver programs, the main idea for the DNS 
protocol was that there are no restrictions who can query RRs (resource records). 
 Protocols like rlogin became more common and that caused pressure for the accuracy 
of information contained in the DNS. Forged information within DNS could lead to 
many security problems. It is not an improving factor that the DNS runs over IP, UDP 
and TCP which are insecure protocols. DNS has lack of authentication and integrity 
checking of the information. The vulnerabilities within the DNS can be divided into 
following categories: Cache poisoning, client flooding, dynamic update vulnerability, 
information leakage, and compromise of the DNS server’s authoritative database. 
In Cache Poisoning method, the main purpose is to input false information to 
nameserver’s  or resolver’s (client) cache. The server has a cache to which it collects 
answers which have been queried from another nameserver. This cache can contain 
also negative answers. When DNS server gets a query from a resolver (client), it first 
looks up if the cache contains the information that the resolver queried.  If the answer 
to a query is not in its cache, the DNS server can forward the query to another DNS 
server. Forwarding the query to a rogue DNS server which has forged information, the 
rogue server answers to query with forged information and cache poisoning occurs. 
Resolver’s (client) cache has the same kind of analogue as the nameserver’s cache. 
Therefore it is also vulnerable for cache poisoning attacks. Cache poisoning is also 
known as DNS spoofing.  
Earlier versions of the BIND were very vulnerable of cache poisoning attacks. There 
were a few of problems which caused security issues. First, nameservers could 
respond to a query with information which did not include the related answer. A DNS 
server which received this spoofed “answer” did not perform any necessary checks to 
assure that the additional information was correct or even related in some way to the 
answer. Therefore a rogue nameserver could fill false information in the additional 
records section of the DNS response message. Another security problem was in earlier 
versions of BIND, that they did not have a feature which verified that the answer was 
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related to the original query. This also made nameservers vulnerable for cache 
poisoning. With cache poisoning, an attacker’s goal is to execute a denial of service 
attack or masquerade as a trusted entity. For example, the attacker can forward client 
to forged HTTP server by injecting forged information to nameserver’s or resolver’s 
cache. Usually these forged HTTP servers include other malicious code which can 
infect client computers. 
Client flooding is one method to execute DoS attack. The client is flooded with 
thousands of answers from the rogue nameserver, the client system sends out a query, 
but receives and accepts thousands of DNS responses. Because the client does not do 
any authentication for the responses, it accepts the messages.  
DNS Dynamic Update Vulnerabilities are also used for denial of service attack 
(DoS). Dynamic DNS is a modification to RFC 1035. DDNS allows dynamic 
updating of DNS resource records. For example DHCP can add or delete host IP 
address and name information to nameserver’s zone files. DDNS update protocol has 
methods to control what applications are allowed to update zone information. These 
access control methods are based on IP addresses and therefore they are vulnerable to 
threats such as IP spoofing.  
An attacker can use DNS tools such as nslookup in Windows computers to request 
zone transfer from nameserver and start footprinting the network. This threat is called 
Information Leakage. An intruder can automatically query IP address to hostname 
mappings in a domain space and discover IP addresses that are not assigned. This 
helps an intruder to use IP spoofing to masquerade as a host of a trusted network.  
The vulnerabilities that are described above forced to develop new security features to 
DNS. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) started working on DNS security 
extensions known as DNSSEC. (Davidowicz 1999.) 
4.2.2 DNSSEC 
RFC 2535 standardizes DNSSEC extensions. The main objective for these security 
enhancements was that they are interoperable with non-security aware 
implementations of DNS. The IETFs work group defined a new set of resource 
records (RRs) which interoperate with existing types of RRs. These new RRs 
improved security of DNS zones. Interoperability allows resolver to query DNSSEC 
information through non-security aware DNS servers and the security aware server to 
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return an answer through non-security aware DNS servers. It also allowed easier 
upgrading process to DNSSEC.  
When DNS was implemented, one of the main principles was that DNS is a public 
service. For a healthy domain name system the correctness and consistency of 
response information is vital. This brought the need for authentication and integrity, 
but because DNS data is public there was no need to implement access control and 
confidentiality to DNSSEC. Authentication and integrity are provided with public key 
technology (PKI). The information that DNS zones contain (RRs) is digitally signed.  
With this technology, servers, resolvers and application which support DNSSEC can 
verify that the information received from the nameserver has not been altered by a 
third party. Even though there were no demands for data confidentially in DNS 
transactions, IETF did not prune in their DNSSEC specifications the ability to provide 
support for confidentiality. This made it possible for other applications to use public 
keys which DNSSEC provides. Security extensions for DNS also provide methods to 
have several keys for a given DNS name. Each key can be created from a different 
cryptographic algorithm. DNSSEC scope can be summarized in three services: key 
distribution, data origin authentication, and transaction and request 
authentication. To utilize DNSSEC features, the nameserver and the resolver have to 
be “security aware” (security-aware nameserver and security-aware resolver).  
The key distribution service offers the retrieval of the public key. When the resolver 
queries the nameserver, it can confirm that the DNS zone data is not changed (answer 
for query is correct) by checking the answer’s digital signature. The digital signature 
is verified with the correct public key which is a certain resource record (DNSKEY) in 
zone information. Other applications can also utilize key distribution service to 
distribute cryptography keys. As mentioned in previous paragraph this service 
supports several different types of keys and different types of key algorithms. 
Data origin authentication is a service which uses the digital signature technology to 
confirm that zone information is trusted. This mitigates threats such as cache 
poisoning. Each DNS zone has a digital signature which contains encrypted hash. The 
hash is generated with certain hash algorithm and the hash value is encrypted with 
private key (digitally signed). The querying party (for example resolver) decrypts the 
message with nameserver zone’s public key and then computes the hash value. 
Nameserver and the resolver have to have equal methods to compute the hash value. 
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After the answer is decrypted with zone’s public key, the resolver compares hash 
values and if the values match, the data has integrity and the origin of the data is 
authentic.       
DNS transaction and request authentication provides security for DNS requests 
and message headers. With this service the resolver can verify that the nameserver 
answers to the original query and the response came from the certain server. 
Nameserver adds special SIG resource record at the end of the reply and digitally 
signs the concatenation of the server's response and the resolver's query. This allows a 
security-aware resolver to verify the transaction. This service is also used in Secure 
DNS Dynamic Update.  DNSSEC provides strong authentication for systems allowed 
to dynamically update DNS zone information.  
Public Key Retrieval from zones can be made in two ways. Resolvers can query 
public key information or the key can be statically configured to the resolver. Both 
ways have certain problems. There is the key trusting issue when obtaining keys with 
DNS query. A public key must have a signature and the signature has to be reliable. 
To address this problem is to configure statically the resolver with the public key that 
authenticates the signed keys below it. This can be done by configuring the resolver 
with root zone’s public key which is a starting point for verifying all keys found 
below it. The maintaining process of statically configured resolvers is arduous. When 
a zone’s key is changed, then all resolvers have to be manually updated to correspond 
to change. (Davidowicz 1999.) 
4.2.3 Windows and DNSSEC 
Windows 7 has a DNS client which is a “non-validating security-aware stub-resolver”. 
This means that this stub-resolver does not perform validation of queried responses. 
The client (stub-resolver) trusts its nameserver which performs validations on behalf 
of client. Because the client does not do validation “Trust Anchors” do not need to be 
configured. The client is said to be security aware because it expects the configured 
DNS server to do validation and send results in the response. When the client sends a 
DNS query to the server it sets the DO bit (value 1) which is situated in DNS packet 
header at the Z-field. The DO bit tells the server that a query came from the security-
aware resolver. The client sets the DO bit only when it queries about DNSSEC 
information. This is a policy based mechanism where the client checks from “Name 
Resolution Policy Table” (NRPT table is stored in client) which domains it is to 
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expect DNSSEC. The client expects from the server the AD bit in the response. If the 
server fails in validation the AD bit is not sent in response and DNS client fails the 
query. Table 1 is presenting example of NRPT (Seshadri 2008.)   
TABLE 1. Example of NRPT (Seshadri 2008) 
Namespace  DNSSEC validation    Last hop – IPsec IPsec encryption level 
*.test.com 
Set DO bit;  
Expect server to validate 
Secure last hop with IPsec High encryption 
*.foo.test.com 
Don’t set DO bit;  
don’t expect server to 
validate 
Don’t secure last hop with 
IPsec 
n/a 
 
Name Resolution Policy Table also defines IPSec connection to security-aware DNS 
server. Because the client cannot authenticate the DNS server (it trusts the server’s 
DNSSEC validation), it has to do the authentication in some other way. The 
authentication can be done with IPSec and IKE (Domain Name System Security 
Extensions.). Authentication with IPSec is explained in chapter “5.4 IPSec and IKE”. 
This authentication mechanism is supported only in Windows 7 and Windows Server 
2008 R2 operating systems. Windows Server 2003 partly supports DNSSEC. The 
server can be a secondary nameserver for DNSSEC zones and Windows XP computer 
can receive DNSSEC queries from the security-aware server. It cannot do validation 
(does not perform any cryptography, authentication, or verification), but it can store 
DNSSEC resource records in the stub resolver’s cache. (Using DNS Security 
Extensions (DNSSEC) 2005.) 
RCF 4035 defines that stub resolver which queries about DNSSEC RRs from the 
recursive nameserver will need to set the DO bit in order to receive DNSSEC RRs. 
Because Windows XP cannot do this, Windows 2003 server can be configured from 
registry to include the DNSSEC resource records in all query responses (Modify 
DNSSEC configuration). 
When the stub resolver queries DNS information from the recursive nameserver and 
the response contains DNSSEC resource records, it caches them in the same way as 
any other resource records. After the client has received the SIG RR relating (digital 
signature) to the resource records, it does not perform DNSSEC authentication where 
the receiver sends an additional query to the server to obtain the corresponding KEY 
record. In other words, resolvers do not authenticate resource records by verifying the 
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signature information contained in the SIG resource record. The resolver does not 
either recognize DNS packet header flags (bits) such as CD and AD bits. (Using DNS 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) 2005.) With CD bit, the security-aware resolver can 
disable signature validation (RFC 4035 2005). AD bit is set if all data in the response 
has been cryptographically verified or otherwise meets the server's local security 
policy (RFC 3655 2003). 
 
5 AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
5.1 Security protocols, access control and authentication 
The security protocols in the computer systems’ are typically designed so that the 
system survives malicious acts such as man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack and 
denial of service attack. These attacks are usually the most common attack types 
which are used to exploit the security protocols. The protection against all possible 
attacks is not rational; therefore protocols are typically designed under certain 
assumptions about the threats.  
Evaluating a protocol involves the current threat model analysis, and the analysis, 
does the protocol manage the threats. (Anderson 2001, 13.) 
There are many ways to categorize threats. Microsoft uses the STRIDE method to 
categorize threat types which are: spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, 
information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege. (Securing 
Windows 2000 Server 2004.) These threats can create vulnerabilities in the computer 
environment and these vulnerabilities can be exploited with different attacks. For 
example, spoofing identity threats contains an illegal use of another person's 
authentication information and obtaining illegal access to computer environment with 
this information. This information is usually gathered with man-in-the-middle attacks 
which the spoofing identity category of threat includes. (Server and Domain Isolation 
Using IPSec and Group Policy 2006, Appendix D.) 
To address the common attacks types, the use of cryptographic authentication 
methods/protocols is needed. (Anderson 2001, 15) The authentication is an important 
part in access control function. In the client’s NAC concept, the client must 
authenticate the network to make a conclusion about the trustworthiness of the 
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network. This chapter introduces the theory of different authentication methods and 
security protocols.  
5.2 Challenge/response method 
Many authentication methods use challenge/response architecture. To understand 
better the authentication methods which are described in this chapter, it is important to 
know basic functionality of challenge/response authentication architecture.    
In Challenge-response (two-pass protocol) method the authenticator (server) and the 
supplicant (client) have a shared secret (for example password string) which is not 
sent through the network.  The authenticator sends a challenge, consisting of a random 
n-bit number to the supplicant. The supplicant computes a response with algorithm F 
from the challenge and the shared secret. The authenticator also computes a response 
from the challenge and the shared secret with the same algorithm F. If the 
authenticator and the supplicant have the same response, the supplicant has proved to 
be the holder of the shared secret. (Käyttäjien tunnistaminen ja PKI, Johdanto 
todentamiseen 2007, 5) 
5.3 DHCP authentication 
To address security issues in DHCP the IETF published RFC 3118 “Authentication 
for DHCP Messages” in June 2001. This RFC defined a new DHCP option which 
provided authentication for DHCP messages. Both clients and servers check the 
authentication information and reject messages that come from invalid sources. RFC 
3118 provides authentication using shared secret or token-based exchange of 
messages. 
DHCP authentication extension to DHCP protocol has not been a success story. The 
problem was that the RFC was released relatively late. There were already millions of 
DHCP clients and servers which did not support this new standard, when it was 
released. The second problem with these extensions is that they are against the DHCP 
main philosophy which was to get away from having to pre-configure clients before 
they can access to the network. Using this standard requires additional configuration 
of the DHCP client, for instance shared secrets, which have to be keyed to client’s 
memory.  
RFC 3118 provides mutual authentication and therefore it is a potential authentication 
alternative in a client’s NAC solution. However, it is a fact that this option is not 
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widely deployed, and most networks must rely on more traditional security operations. 
(Kozierok 2001.) 
The authentication method which is described in the RFC 3118 document is called 
Delayed authentication. RFC describes the use of a new DHCP option type the 
Authentication option. This option type has a certain format for the authentication 
messages.  
 
FIGURE 2. Format of the DHCP authentication option message (RFC 3118 2001) 
The protocol field having value 1 informs that the delayed authentication is in 
question. The authentication request for server is sent in DHCPDISCOVER message. 
The client includes to the authentication request a client identifier option to identify 
itself uniquely to the server. Discover message includes just the authentication 
request, so it does not include the client’s authentication information; therefore first 
DHCP message the DHCPDISCOVER message is not authenticated. The client only 
adds a nonce value to this message. Hostile clients could flood server with 
DHCPDISCOVER messages. 
  
FIGURE 3. Format of DHCP authentication request in a DHCPDISCOVER or a 
DHCPINFORM message (RFC 3118 2001) 
The server answers to request with a DHCPOFFER message which contains the 
authentication information. The authentication information field includes a nonce 
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value generated by the source as a message authentication code (MAC) to provide 
message authentication and entity authentication. When a client receives an offer, it 
can verify that the message is a reply to its DHCPDISCOVER message by computing 
the nonce value which was sent in the original discover message. The client identifier 
option was also included in it DHCPDISCOVER message to identify itself uniquely to 
the server. After the server has received the discover message it computes with client 
identifier and master key (MK) the client’s key (K) and adds the secret ID value and 
MAC value to DHCPOFFER message. MAC value is computed from whole DHCP 
message including the DHCP message header and the options field. These are used as 
input to the HMAC-MD5 computation function.  The secret ID is the identifier of the 
secret used to generate the MAC.  
The client first checks that the value in the replay detection field is acceptable in 
DHCPOFFER message. This field monotonically increases counter, which mitigates 
replay attack threat.  Next, the client computes the MAC. It uses its shared key, DHCP 
message information and same MAC algorithm than server used.  If the MAC value is 
equal with the MAC value in DHCP offer message, the server is trusted. Otherwise 
the DHCP message is discarded. After the client has authenticated the server it accepts 
the offer and sends DHCPREQUEST message which includes the client’s 
authentication information. The server uses the same methods than the client to do the 
authentication.  
Delayed authentication is based on a shared secret. To utilize shared key techniques, it 
is safer to create each client their own key, because if all clients have the same key, 
unauthorized clients can masqueraded as authorized clients by obtaining a copy of the 
shared key. In this key utilization case, each server must know each client’s key to 
authenticate the client. The key is created with MAC (message authentication code) 
from master key and unique identifier. The client identifier (unique identifier) can be 
for example subnet address or MAC address, which is unique to a certain client. The 
key (K) is generated with formula K = MAC(MK, unique-id). MK is a master secret 
key and MAC is a keyed one-way function, for example HMAC-MD5. 
Without the master key MK, a client cannot create its own key K.  Using the master 
key to create other keys has some advantages. First, the server can verify the received 
message by regenerating K from the client-id. This means that the server does not 
need to check any plain passwords. Second, verifying the MAC by computing it, the 
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server does not require separate authentication server. For better security, it is 
recommended that the MK is not stored by any clients. If MK is compromised, all 
clients can have new individual keys by creating a new MK. 
  
FIGURE 4. Format of the authentication information in a DHCPOFFER, 
DHCPREQUEST or DHCPACK message (RFC 3118 2001) 
As earlier mentioned K means a shared secret value between the source and 
destination.  Each shared secret has a secret ID value which has its own field in the 
message. Secret ID is a unique identifier for the shared secret value used to generate 
the MAC for this message. MAC can be created for example with HMAC-MD5 
function. The receiver can determine from secret ID value which shared secret was 
used to generate the MAC in the DHCP message. (RFC 3118 2001.) 
Microsoft does not support the RFC 3118 (IPv6 Security Considerations and 
Recommendations). 
5.4 IPSec and IKE 
Microsoft Windows XP has built in IPSec services, so there is no need for separate 
VPN (or IPSec) client. MS IPSec supports also securing remote access over Internet 
using the Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). Therefore the client is called 
L2TP/IPSec VPN client. IPSec protocol is integrated to Windows 2000/2003 domains 
and the Active Directory services. IPSec policies could be distributed by AD group 
policy to Windows 2000\2003\XP AD domain member computers. (Szymanski, 27-
28.) 
IPSec (Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol) is protocols/services to provide 
cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. It provides access control, 
data integrity, data origin authentication and confidentiality (encryption). The traffic 
security protocols that IPSec offers are: Authentication Header (AH) and the 
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Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Security services and protocols are agreed in 
IPSec security associations (IPSec SA). IKE (Internet Key Exchange Protocol) 
protocol provides key exchange for IPSec peers and negotiation for IPSec SAs. AH 
and ESP use symmetric keys to encrypt the traffic, therefore there is a need for 
changing keys between peers in IPSec connections. (RFC 2401 1998.)  
IKE has two phases: 
 IKE phase 1 which is used to authenticate and protect the identities of the 
IPSec peers and negotiate keys. Key negotiation is performed as an 
authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange with the end result of having matching 
shared secret keys. IKE peers then use these keys to communicate securely 
during phase 2 negotiations. (IKE phase 1 has two different modes: main 
mode and aggressive mode) 
 IKE phase 2 has one mode (quick mode). After IKE has established the secure 
tunnel in phase 1, quick mode occurs. Quick mode negotiates a shared IPSec 
policy, derives shared secret keying material used for the IPSec security 
algorithms, and establishes IPSec SAs. Quick mode exchanges nonces that 
provide replay protection and generates new shared secret key material. 
When IPSec peers negotiate security associations, they also have to authenticate each 
other, so that the connection is established with the trusted entity. This authentication 
is made in IKE phase 1, and there are three options to authenticate peers:  
 Pre-shared key 
 Public key (PKI) 
 Digital signature 
Both digital signature and public key authentication require certificates. (RFC 2409. 
1998) 
The authentication in IKE phase 1 is computer to computer authentication with one of 
the techniques described above. When designing Client’s NAC system, the main idea 
for the authentication module is that the authentication is made without user 
interaction. Microsoft L2TP/IPSec VPN Client implementation and Microsoft IKE 
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slightly differ from basic authentication methods. Windows IKE can use one of the 
following three methods:  
 The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol 
 X.509 digital certificate with corresponding public and private Rivest, Shamir, 
& Adleman (RSA) key pair 
 A pre-shared key 
The misunderstanding that Windows IPSec requires public key infrastructure (PKI) 
certificates, which are often difficult to deploy, is a common reason why organizations 
do not deploy IPSec. Because PKI infrastructure is quite heavy to deploy, Microsoft 
integrated Kerberos version 5 in the IKE negotiation protocol. (Server and Domain 
Isolation Using IPSec and Group Policy 2006.) 
5.4.1 Server and domain isolation techniques 
Server and domain isolation is designed to work with the existing devices and 
techniques in the user’s network infrastructure. The key point is that the isolation is 
implemented by making IPSec policies and distributing these policies via AD group 
policies. Traditional isolation is done with different technologies and procedures such 
as network segmentation with firewalls, VLANs and perimeter network access 
controls. Server and domain isolation can be implemented with little or no change in 
the existing network paths and connection methods, with little or no change to 
applications, and with an existing Windows 2000 or Windows Server 2003 domain 
infrastructure. 
Server and domain isolation techniques are based on two mechanisms: host 
authentication and host authorization.  
The host authentication mechanism inspects whether the initiator computer of the 
connection has valid credentials. The credentials are inspected from the Kerberos 
ticket, a certificate or a pre-shared key. There are two technologies that can provide 
this type of authentication mechanism on Windows-based computers; these 
technologies are the 802.1X protocol and IPSec. 
After the host has determined that the communication comes from a valid (trusted) 
source, the host has to make a decision whether to allow or deny access. Even though 
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the device is authenticated, it does not guarantee that it is allowed to access a certain 
host. These restrictions are made with standard Windows groups to limit the users' and 
computers' abilities to access the resources on other computers. There is also a 
possibility to make user right assignments based on network, for example "Access this 
computer from the Network" (ALLOW) and the "Deny access to this computer from 
the network" (DENY).  
Here is an example of a five-step process how authentication and authorization work 
with IPSec using Kerberos authentication and group policy.  
1. User who is logged to client computer tries to get access to a share on a file 
server. File server is trusted host within the logical isolation. Client computer 
initiates the connection by connecting to server’s TCP port 445. Client has 
IPSec policy for that server and protocol (TCP 445). Connection request to 
servers TCP 445 port triggers an IKE negotiation to the server. The client IKE 
obtains a Kerberos ticket to authenticate to the server. 
2. In IKE phase 1 the server authenticates the Kerberos ticket. During the 
authentication process, IKE checks the ALLOW or DENY users rights from 
the Group Policy. With the required user right assignment, the IKE negotiation 
will complete, and an IPSec main mode SA will be established. 
3. IPSec policy is checked to negotiate security settings for the IPSec connection.  
4. After IPsec-protected communication is established, user host access 
permissions are checked on the server to verify that user has the required host 
access permissions in the Group Policy for the trusted host. 
Finally, the standard Windows share and file access permissions are checked to ensure 
that user has the required permissions to access the data. (Server and Domain Isolation 
Using IPSec and Group Policy 2006.) 
5.4.2 X.509 digital certificate 
A certificate is a digitally signed statement which uses PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) 
technology.  
PKI is based on a pair of encryption keys; public key and private key. The keys can be 
attached to identity of the person, device, or service. (Administrator's Guide to 
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Microsoft L2TP/IPSec VPN Client 2002.) The main idea is that a public key can be 
send over network and it is available for everyone. The private key is known and kept 
only by the owner. The usage of keys depends on whether encrypting the data or 
digitally signs data. A classic public key encryption example for encrypt data between 
two parties is presented as follows: Alice (A) and Bob (B). Alice and Bob have both 
public keys Aa, Bb and private keys Ai and Bj. Alice sends data D to Bob, it uses 
Bob’s public key and known encryption algorithm to encrypt data which looks this: 
Bb(D). When Bob receives the data it uses its private key and known decryption 
algorithm to decrypt the data: Bj(Bb(D)). In digital signatures, the method is somewhat 
different. The data is signed with the sender’s private key and the receiver can validate 
the sign with sender’s public key. (Kurose J & Ross K 2008, 691, 701.) 
PKI has one problem; it is vulnerable for man-in-the-middle attacks, because public 
keys are known for everyone. For example if Cecilia (C) is eavesdropping Alice’s and 
Bob’s communication: Alice sends its public key Aa to Bob. Cecilia hijacks the public 
key Aa and sends its own public key Cc to Bob. Cecilia claims to be Alice. Now Bob 
sends a message M to Alice with Cecilia’s public key Cc(M). Cecilia hijacks the 
message and decrypts it with its own secret key Ck;  Ck(Cc(M)). Now Cecilia can read 
and change the message. She can forward the message to Alice with Alice’s public 
key which she has hijacked. Alice decrypts the message and does not notice anything 
about the man-in-the-middle attack. (Käyttäjän tunnistaminen ja PKI 
Varmennejärjestelmien perusideat 2007, 2.)  
A solution for this problem is public key certification. A certificate confirms that a 
certain public key belongs to a specific party. The basic idea in certificates is that a 
third party digitally signs the subject’s (owner’s) public key information. The third 
party is called a certification authority (CA). (Käyttäjän tunnistaminen ja PKI 
Varmennejärjestelmien perusideat 2007, 2.) Standards for CAs are ITU X.509 and 
RCF 1422 which describes CA based key management for use with secure e-mail 
(Kurose J & Ross K 2008, 707).  
CA validates identities and issues certificates, which means that Alice can trust Bob’s 
public key and certificate if she also trusts the CA which has issued Bob’s certificate. 
In IPSec authentication, each node on the connection validates the other node's 
certificate. For example, Alice must have a copy of the certificate for the issuer of 
Bob's certificate installed locally. If CAbob issued Bob's certificate, then in order to 
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validate Bob's certificate, Alice must have the certificate for CAbob installed. 
Otherwise authentication with certificates fails. In the same way, Bob must have a 
certificate for CAalice installed.  
Certificate infrastructure is hierarchical. The root CA in certificate infrastructures is 
the highest CA in hierarchy and the root CA can have intermediate CAs which are 
located below the root. If the issuing CA for a certificate is an intermediate CA, then 
the node performing validation must trust all CAs in the chain including the root CA. 
The term for this is: validating a certificate chain. The simplest certificate 
infrastructure has a single root CA which issues certificates to all entities requiring 
authentication. For example, certificates for both Alice and Bob are issued by a root 
CA. In installation phase both certificates Alice’s and the copy of root CAs certificate 
are installed to Alice. Similarly Bob needs Bob’s certificate and the copy of root CA’s 
certificate.  
X.509 certificate has got several fields. It contains much more information than just 
the CA’s digital signature. Hence, when a node validates the other node’s certificate it 
has to do several checks about the certificate. First, the digital signature is verified 
for each certificate by obtaining the public key from the issuing CA certificate. 
Second, a certificate must not be expired. When certificates are issued, they have a 
validity period, this field contains the start day and the end day of the period. Third, a 
certificate must not have been revoked. Issued certificates can be revoked at any time. 
The issuing CA maintains a list of certificates that have been revoked. This list is 
called certificate revocation list (CRL). Usually CRL is distributed to a dedicated 
computer. When checking that a certificate has not been revoked, the node has to 
check CRL. If the updating interval is long, there is a risk that a certificate that has 
been revoked can still be used because the published CRL that the node is checking is 
out of date. (Administrator's Guide to Microsoft L2TP/IPSec VPN Client 2002.) 
5.4.3 Opportunistic Encryption (OE) 
Opportunistic encryption is based on IPSec protocols, IKE and DNSSEC for key 
distribution. The basic idea is that two peers can create an IPSec tunnel by asking the 
public keys or certificates from DNSSEC server. Because DNSSEC RRs contain the 
digital signature and this can be validated from trust anchors, the key information 
(certificates or public keys) that is received from DNSSEC are trusted, therefore OE is 
resistant to passive attacks and active attackers as well.  
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OE allows secure communication between peers without any pre-arrangement specific 
to the pair of systems involved.  This makes it possible to create secure 
communication with an entity that is not known in advance. Each peer’s public key 
information has to be keyed to DNS record (KEY RR and TXT RR) to support 
opportunistic encryption and then enables this feature in the peers IPsec stack. After 
this, any two such peers can communicate securely.  
Basically OE is designed for security routers, if we have two nodes A and B and these 
nodes have security routers A-SR and B-SR. In this kind of environment, the OE 
process would be following (RFC 4322 2005.):  
1. A sends traffic to B, traffic travels through A-SR. A-SR checks if there is an 
IPSec policy for this traffic. 
2. If there is an IPSec policy, A-SR check from DNS server B’s reverse DNS 
record (which is located in the reverse DNS in-addr.arpa) and corresponding 
TXT record. TXT record contains B-SR’s IP address and public key 
information. 
3. A-SR initiates IKE negotiation with B-SR. B-SR checks from DNS server A-
SR’s key (public key) information. It queries KEY record from reverse DNS 
zone (A-SR IP address has corresponding KEY RR). After successful check 
IKE SAs are negotiated. 
4. The IPSec tunnel is established.  
OE utilizes IPSec protocol, IKE and DNSSEC. Windows XP supports the OE; 
therefore it is applicable for the client’s NAC authentication process. The 
authentication methods that Windows XP supports in OE are pre-shared key and 
certificates. The pre-shred key is not rational choice if OE is used, for example in 
public WLANs. The best choice is to use a certificate from a universally recognized 
CA. The CA with the widest distribution of certificates produces the greatest 
opportunity for IPsec communications. There are many possibilities on the Internet to 
create one’s own CA and certificates. Thawte (Freemail certificate) is a common CA 
which can be used to obtain free personal certificate, the benefit in Thawte is that the 
root Freemail CA certificate is already installed in Windows XP. This means that the 
computer trusts other computers which have certificates that are signed with Thawte 
CA. (Steps to turn on optional IPsec on a Windows XP computer 2006.) 
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5.5 Certificate based authentication using IEEE 802.1X and EAP-TLS as a 
authentication protocol 
802.1X is an IEEE standard which describes authenticated access to IEEE 802 media 
such as: Ethernet, Token Ring, and 802.11 wireless LANs. 802.1X provides port 
based authentication and it is one of the main technology solutions in Network Access 
Control concept. For example, port based authentication provides authentication 
methods to network equipment to join the network via Ethernet switch or wireless 
LAN access point. Actually, some consider that the 802.1X is NAC. NAC is more 
than just the port based authentication, but the 802.1X is an important part of NAC 
which enhances security and deployment by providing support for centralized user 
identification, authentication, dynamic key management, and accounting. 
(Understanding 802.1X authentication for wireless networks 2005.) 
RFC3579 defines Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) support for 
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).  RADIUS is a networking protocol that 
provides centralized access, authorization and accounting (AAA) management for 
people or computers to connect and use a network service. RADIUS support is 
optional within IEEE 802.1X; still most of the implementations have different entities 
for authenticators and authentication servers (EAP server). These components can be 
in the same entity but generally authenticators will function as RADIUS clients and 
authentication servers will function as RADIUS servers and both stand in their own 
dedicated entity. The protocol used to relay authentication messages between the 
authenticator and authentication server is RADIUS.  RADIUS server can either act as 
an authentication server or it can forward authentication messages to another 
authentication server (act as an authenticator).  
IEEE 802.1X offers an effective framework for authenticating and controlling user 
traffic to a protected network. The protected network has certain components such as: 
supplicant (client), authenticator and authentication server. Authenticator and 
authentication server work together to make decisions which the supplicant can join to 
network. It was explained in chapter 1 (Introduction) how NAC handles protection 
from “network perspective”. 802.1X is a good example of this kind of perspective, the 
client (supplicant) cannot be sure if the network is trusted or if it is connected to 
network where 802.1X is not implemented. Is this a suitable authentication method for 
client’s NAC implementation? 802.1X ties a protocol called EAP (Extensible 
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Authentication Protocol) to IEEE802 media. EAP is a “carrier” protocol which can 
transport multiple authentication methods. The client’s NAC main requirement for 
authentication is that the client can authenticate the network. One of the authentication 
methods that EAP offers is mutual authentication. Mutual authentication means that 
the client can authenticate the network and vice versa. This kind of authentication is 
applicable to the client’s NAC implementation by forcing the client to use only this 
authentication method. If the network does not have 802.1X architecture and the client 
cannot authenticate the authentication server, the network is untrusted. The mutual 
authentication method which EAP provides is EAP-TLS. It provides strong security 
with X.509 certificates and symmetric encryption keys. EAP-TLS encapsulates the 
TLS/SSL protocol within EAP messages.   
Extensible Authentication Protocol is described in RFC 2284. EAP is used to transport 
and manage authentication information between the supplicant (peer) and the 
authentication server. EAP messages use request/respond mode to interact between 
peer and EAP-server (authentication server). Messages have four different “labels”: 
EAP-Request, EAP-Response, EAP-Success, and EAP-Failure. EAP conversation has 
following phases: 
 EAP client starts EAP conversation by turning itself to passive listening mode, 
waiting for the authenticator to initiate authentication. Authenticator is usually 
in wired connections a LAN switch and in wireless connections it is a wireless 
access point (AP). 
 The authenticator sends EAP request to the peer. The Request has a type field 
“Identity” 
 The peer responds with its identity and the authenticator forwards the EAP 
message to the authentication server (For example RADIUS server) 
 The authentication server determines which EAP authentication mechanism to 
use with the peer and sends one or more requests for authentication method 
that has been chosen. The client and the server must use the same 
authentication method in order for authentication to be successful 
 The peer answers each request with a response      .  
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 The EAP conversation is terminated by the authentication server by sending 
the peer either an EAP-Success or EAP-Failure message. The authentication 
server also notifies the authenticator the result of authentication. Notify is done 
by RADIUS Access-Accept or Access-Reject message which contains either 
an EAP-Success or EAP-Failure attribute.  
If authentication fails the authenticator (LAN switch or AP) closes the port or in 
wireless case it closes the connection which the client is connected to and the client 
does not get access to the network. Only EAP conversation is accepted network traffic 
in the authentication phase, other traffic is denied by the LAN switch or AP. EAP 
messages from the authenticator to the RADIUS server are encapsulated to RADIUS 
packets using the EAP-Message attribute. (RFC 3579 2003.) 
 TLS offers security services for TCP protocol such as: confidentiality, data integrity 
and strong end-point authentication with X.509 certificates. EAP-TLS defines EAP 
type for TLS and Flags field. The TLS Start flag is used by the authentication server 
to indicate that following EAP messages will contain EAP encapsulated TLS 
messages. When the client sees this flag set in a message from the server, it starts a 
TLS negotiation process on top of EAP. 
RFC5216 “The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol” defines EAP-Transport Layer 
Security.  EAP-TLS supports certificate-based mutual authentication and key 
derivation, using encrypted negotiation, mutual authentication and key management 
capabilities of the TLS protocol. The EAP-TLS authentication with certificates 
contains following steps:  
1. The Authenticator and the peer (supplicant) start the EAP-TLS conversation 
with negotiating EAP.  The authenticator sends an EAP-Request/Identity 
packet to the peer. 
2. The peer responds with an EAP-Response/Identity packet which contains the 
peer's user-Id. The authenticator usually works as a pass-through device (for 
example authenticator could be LAN switch), which forwards EAP packets to 
the EAP server (for example EAP server can be radius server).  
3. When the EAP server has received the peer's Identity, the EAP server responds 
with an EAP-TLS/Start packet. This is an EAP-Request packet with EAP-
Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit set, and no data.   
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4. The EAP-TLS conversation start with the peer sending an EAP-Response 
packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet encapsulates 
one or more TLS records in TLS record layer format, containing a TLS 
client_hello handshake message. TLS handshake protocol has a cipher spec 
item which specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, DES,      
etc.) and a MAC algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA). It also defines      
cryptographic attributes such as the hash size. The cipher spec for the TLS 
records is TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL and null compression. This 
cipher spec remains the same until the change_cipher_spec message signals 
transitions in ciphering strategies. TLS version number, a sessionId, a random 
number, and a set of ciphersuites supported by the supplicant are TLS client 
hello message’s attributes. 
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FIGURE 5. First four stages of the EAP-TLS authentication (RFC 5216 2008) 
 
5. The EAP server responds with an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-
TLS. The data field of this packet also encapsulates one or more TLS records.  
Records include:  TLS server_hello handshake message. This hello message 
has the same format as client hello message has: TLS version number, random 
number, a sessionId, and a ciphersuite. The server chooses a ciphersuite from 
peer’s ciphersuite set. TLS certificate message which contains a public key 
certificate chain for either a key exchange public key (such as an RSA or 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange public key) or a signature public key (such as an 
RSA or Digital Signature Standard (DSS) signature public key). 
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Server_key_exchange message allows the key exchange to take place. 
Certificate_request message is included when the server desires the peer to 
authenticate itself via public key. TLS server_hello_done which is the last 
handshake message encapsulated in this EAP-Request packet,   
6. The peer responds with an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS.  
The data field of this packet encapsulates one or more TLS records containing 
a TLS client_key_exchange, change_cipher_spec, certificate message 
which contains a certificate for the peer's signature public key, 
certificate_verify includes the peer's signed authentication response to the 
EAP server. Finally this EAP-response packet includes TLS finished message.  
7. After receiving this packet, the EAP server responds with an EAP-Request 
packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. Server verifies the peer's certificate and 
digital signature. The Packet includes, in the case of a new TLS session, one or 
more TLS records containing TLS change_cipher_spec and TLS finished 
messages. The TLS finished contains the EAP server's authentication response 
to the peer. 
8. Peer verifies the TLS finished message in order to authenticate the EAP server. 
If authentication is successful, peer sends EAP-Request packet of EAP-
Type=EAP-TLS and no data. 
9. Finally server sends EAP-Success message to peer. (RFC 5216 2008.) 
48 
 
FIGURE 6. The latter five stages of the EAP-TLS authentication (RFC 5216 2008) 
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6 NETWORK AUTHENTICATION METHODS FOR 
CLIENT’S NAC IMPLEMENTATION 
6.1 Access control fundamentals in client’s NAC implementation 
“Access control is the traditional center of gravity of computer security. It is where 
security engineering meets computer science”. (Anderson 2001, 51) 
Implementing the client’s NAC, the access control concentrates on computer to 
computer authentication or network to computer authentication. This means that the 
client has to decide if it is going to join the network. This kind of access control is not 
traditional, because it does not give access rights to client’s resources; it just controls 
client access to network. If the client does not trust the network, it does not join to it 
and it does not send information about itself to the network. The client has to execute 
authentication and investigations from a network so that all these functions are 
invisible for end users and also these functions should not significantly slow down the 
client’s joining process to the network.  
Chapter 6 introduces several ways to implement different kinds of access control 
methods for the client computer. This includes introduction to how different 
authentication methods could be applicable to a client’s NAC. Some of the 
authentication methods are conducted from certain network protocols such as NBT, 
DCHP and DNS. Some authentication methods use known authentication methods 
such as IPSec (IKE) and EAP. Common for all these methods is that they all need 
some kind of information or service from the network.  
The back side of the coin is that these access control methods can also restrict 
usability if they are badly designed. If the service is down or the information is lost 
from a trusted network, the client cannot get access to it. One of the main goals for 
client’s NAC implementation is that it cannot create a single point of failure to 
network and it cannot restrict usability. Services or information in the network has to 
be duplicated.   
Designing the Client’s NAC implementation, one of the corner stones is that the 
implementation is based on mistrust. The implementation can be divided to three 
upper level stages, which are:  
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 Network connection is started from a state in which both participants do not 
trust each other 
 Network to computer authentication and verification 
 Allowing or denying access to network 
6.2 The basics of client’s Network Access Control 
The main function in client’s NAC implementation is that the client authenticates the 
network and determines if the network is trusted. The determination process needs an 
application which can carry out the determination by the result of the authentication. 
This application also has another significant task. It has to control the client’s network 
traffic. First, this application has to observe the state of network interfaces, when an 
application notices that network interface has activated, it has to notify the 
authentication module that authentication has to be done. If the authentication process 
is unsuccessful, the network is untrusted and the network interface has to be disabled. 
Because this application has to observe the result of authentication and the network 
interface, it can be called observing application. Thereby, the client’s NAC 
implementation is based on two main modules; the authentication module (AM) and 
the observing module (OM or observing application). Figure 7 describes how these 
modules interoperate. 
 
FIGURE 7. Interoperability of authentication and observing module 
Figure 8 describes the access process in client’s NAC implementation. 
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FIGURE 8. Client’s NAC access process flowchart 
The authentication methods that are presented in this chapter can be divided into: 
shared secret methods, IPSec authentication with different authentication methods and 
802.1X authentication with certificates. Because the authentication methods which are 
conducted from the network protocols are based on basic challenge/response and 
shared secret methods, it is logical to start the introduction from this kind of 
authentication.  
6.3 Challenge/response authentication method for client’s NAC 
In client’s NAC implementation the authenticator is the client, which sends a 
challenge to the network, for example to certain server. The client and the network’s 
server must have the same shared secret. Both client and server compute and create 
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from the challenge message digest with SHA-1 algorithm. Server sends this message 
digest to client and client validates the message digest. If the message digests are 
matching, the network is trusted. Figure 9 is describing the different stages of the 
challenge/response authentication. 
 
FIGURE 9. Example of challenge/response method with shared key encryption 
The problems in random numbers are that they could not be random enough. This 
creates vulnerability to authentication if random numbers are predictable. 
6.4 Using NBT for the network authentication 
One way to implement network authentication is to use information which the 
network already has. The same in security terms; using the shared secret. With NBT 
there are several ways to implement network authentication. Using the name service 
in NBT and its name registration process, the first alternative authentication method is 
that the client is listening for a certain name registration broadcast from the network.  
At default, NBT-nodes are B-nodes so in this authentication method there has to be 
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“beacon” in every subnet. When “beacon” broadcasts its NetBIOS names to subnet, 
the client computer can make decisions based on beacons NetBIOS name if the 
network is a correct one. The Beacon has to have a function to notice when a new 
computer is connected to subnet, because otherwise it has to send broadcast traffic all 
the time to network subnet. The beacon should not cause broadcast flood to subnet. 
Figure 10 describes the authentication phases of the NBT with beacon method. 
 
FIGURE 10. NBT with beacon authentication phases 
The second alternative is that the network has WINS servers which the client is sends 
a certain NetBIOS name request to; if the answer is positive the client initiates 
NetBIOS session connection to this certain computer. If a session is established, the 
network is correct. 
The third alternative uses NetBIOS scope ID. The client and the network’s other 
computers have a certain NetBIOS scopeID. ScopeID is configured from Windows 
registry by IT-support. If a client cannot establish a NetBIOS session to certain 
name/computer, the network is untrusted.  
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6.5 Using DHCP protocol for authenticating the network 
 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a common service in IP networks. 
DHCP is a network application protocol used by devices (DHCP clients) to obtain IP 
configuration information such as: IP-address, subnet mask, default-gateway and DNS 
server IP-address.  This protocol allows devices to be connected to the network with 
little or no manual configuration. From authentication perspective, the client using 
DHCP information for recognizing the connected network goes the same category 
than client using NBT information. The client authenticates the network with the 
information that network has.  
In client’s NAC solution there are a few options how to implement authentication by 
DHCP. First, DHCP authentication which is described in RCF 3118 can be used for 
authenticating the network.  
Using DHCP authentication option in client’s NAC solution needs clients and servers 
which are supporting RFC 3118. These are not commonly used because RFC 3118 
was released relatively late. There were already many clients and servers in the 
Internet which did not support this RFC.  Because authentication is based on shared 
keys, the shared keys have to distribute with offline method.  DHCP authentication 
offers mutual authentication and therefore it is suitable for client’s NAC. The basic 
function for authentication in client’s NAC solution using DHCP authentication is: 
 Client computer is forced to use DHCP to obtain network settings 
 When client receives DHCP offer message, it can authenticate the server and if 
server is authenticated successfully, the network is trusted 
 RFC 3118 takes into consideration also cases when network connection is 
broken. In renewing, init/reboot and rebinding stages the client uses the secret 
it used in its initial DHCPREQUEST message. If the network connection 
“goes down” the authentication is automatically repeated 
Authentication in client’s NAC solution can be also made without DHCP 
authentication option. There are a software tools which can detect rogue DHCP 
servers from a network. The basic idea of this kind of software is that they send 
DHCPDISCOVER messages to network and inspects if there are unknown servers 
answering these discover messages. The inspection is based on IP addresses. 
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DHCPOFFER message contains a server identification field in DHCP options. This 
field contains the server’s IP address. Network administrators define real DHCP 
server IP addresses for software and software detects other than these real DHCP 
servers from network. The software can also display the network configuration 
information offered by the server.  
With this knowledge we can develop a method for lighter authentication by utilizing 
DHCP. There are number of options to develop this method.  
 Option 1: The client can use the tool which can find rogue servers to 
authenticate the network. Before the client sends any data to network, it 
executes Dhcploc tool which one example of this kind of tool. If the tool finds 
rogue DHCP servers network is not trusted and the client closes its network 
interface. The tool has to be preconfigured by administrators. Dhcploc.exe is 
Microsoft’s command-line tool which displays the DHCP servers active on the 
subnet. In the case of unauthorized DHCP servers, it can create and send alert 
messages. Tool can also display packets that it detects from DHCP servers. 
Administrators can choose whether to display packets from all DHCP servers 
or only from unauthorized servers. The system requirements for Dhcploc are 
Windows XP Professional or Windows Server 2003. 
 Option 2: A key is created from network settings and stored to the client by 
offline. This key is created from network setting which already known for 
network administrators. These kinds of settings are DHCP server IP address, 
DNS server address and subnet address. The key is computed from these 
attributes. The client has an application which observes DHCP messages. 
When the client gets DHCPOFFER message from the server, the observing 
application computes from the offer message the same attributes that had been 
computed for the key. If the key value and the computed value are the same, 
the observing software does not do anything. If the values are not matching, 
the observing application closes the network interface. 
6.6 Using DNS for authenticating the network     
Using DNS protocol to authenticate the network is somewhat different from for 
example using DHCP and NBT. The difference between these protocols is that DNS 
requires user interactions. Client resolver starts and sends query to DNS server when a 
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user is for instance using web browser and keying a web page name to the browser. 
One of the client’s NAC demands was that the authentication is executed immediately 
when the computer is connected to the network and the authentication is done without 
user interactions. Because of this demand the client computer has to send 
automatically a DNS query to the network. DNS protocol does not authenticate 
messages and it has a poor security which was described in chapter 4.2.1 “Security 
threats in DNS”. DNSSEC was implemented to address these security threats and it 
has mutual authentication which can be applied to the client’s NAC implementation to 
authenticate the network. 
The authentication and the validation mechanisms with NRPT (Name Resolution 
Policy Table) in DNSSEC are supported only in Windows 7 and Windows Server 
2008 R2 operating systems. These mechanisms are described in chapter “4.2.3 
Windows and DNSSEC”. Windows XP partly supports DNSSEC. It cannot do 
validation but it can store DNSSEC resource records in the stub resolver’s cache. 
Because this thesis mainly concentrates on Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, 
we have to implement other methods to do the authentication in client’s NAC solution 
with DNS protocol.  
Even though Windows XP does not support DNSSEC validation, the information that 
it stores to resolver’s cache can be used to authenticate the network. Using this 
information to authenticate the network, the network needs a security-aware DNS 
server. Once again the client must have an application which observes DNS messages 
and it has to have functionality to send certain DNS queries to a certain DNS server. 
The method for authentication by using DNS protocol is following: 
1. When a client is connected to network, it immediately sends a DNS query to a 
recursive (Windows 2003 server, which is the secondary nameserver for zone 
test.com) DNS server (DNS servers are defined in client’s network settings). 
The query must be directed to DNSSEC zone (e.g. query www.test.com), so 
that the response contains SIG RR for the queried record. The information 
where to query and what has to be query is keyed for the client offline and 
before it is going to connect to network. In addition the client must have the 
test.com zone’s public key information. This information is a kind of shared 
key. 
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2. After the client has queried and stored the response to stub resolver’s cache, 
the observing application inspects the SIG RR and compares to it KEY 
information that has already stored to client’s memory (shared key).  
3. If KEY value matches with the signature (signature is trusted), the server is 
trusted and also the network is trusted. Otherwise the observing software 
closes the network connection. 
Basically idea of this authentication is that the client has a “shared key” which 
contains the information that should be in the network which it is going to join. It 
compares this information to the information that it gets from DNS server. If the 
information matches, the network is trusted. 
6.7 Microsoft VPN architecture for authenticate the network  
This thesis is limited to Microsoft networks and Windows XP operating system. 
Microsoft has its own VPN architecture and its components are installed into XP 
operating systems. Therefore Microsoft’s IPSec implementation is a considerable 
choice for authentication and encryption in a client’s NAC implementation. This 
chapter concentrates on IPSec authentication possibilities for the client’s NAC 
implementation. 
The ability to assign IPSec policies through the group policies is the main idea for 
“Server and Domain Isolation”, which is briefly described in chapter 2.4. This IPSec 
and group policy method that is described in “Server and Domain Isolation Using 
IPSec and Group Policy” is also a suitable option to implement authentication in 
client’s NAC application.  
For the client’s NAC implementation the authentication could be following: Client is 
forced to make a name query when it is connected to network, or its network interface 
rises up. After client has noticed that the network connection is up, it performs 
following steps:  
1. The client has an IPSec policy and group policy for DNS query. When the 
client is sending name query request to server’s port UDP 53, it initiates IKE 
negotiation to server. The client IKE obtains a Kerberos ticket to authenticate 
to the server. 
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2. The server authenticates the Kerberos ticket. During the authentication 
process, IKE checks the ALLOW or DENY users rights from the Group 
Policy. With the required user right assignment, the IKE negotiation will 
complete, and an IPSec main mode SA will be established. 
3. IPSec policy is checked to negotiate security settings for the IPSec connection.  
4. After IPsec-protected communication is established, the user host access 
permissions are checked on the server to verify that the user has the required 
host access permissions in the Group Policy for the trusted host. 
5. After the client computer has received the answer for the DNS query, the 
observing application can make decision that network is trusted. If there is a 
trusted computer, there has to be also a trusted network. 
6.7.1 Microsoft L2TP/IPSec VPN Client and certificates 
The L2TP/IPSec VPN authentication can be applied in the client’s NAC system. In 
this case Network has to have a VPN server and a root CA. Microsoft L2TP/IPSec 
VPN implementation needs still some tailoring. The authentication has to be done 
without user interaction, so the connection to VPN server has to be done 
automatically. Client computer’s joining process to the network with IPSec 
authentication is following: 
1. A computer is connected to the network. Before it sends any traffic to the 
network, it connects to known VPN server (connection is encrypted). 
2. The client computer authenticates with computer certificate to VPN server. 
(Assuming that certificates are distributed to all parties) 
3. If authentication is successful, the client can be sure that it is connected to 
trusted network. 
4. After successful authentication, the client can open its “normal” traffic 
(including the NBT traffic) towards the network. If authentication is 
unsuccessful, the client does not open any traffic towards the network. In 
another words; the client stays silent. 
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5. Authentication must be done every time a client computer is connected to the 
network. Network interface card listens for a network signal and when it gets 
the signal, the first thing to do is authentication 
Because this authentication is done when client computers network interface card 
(NIC) gets the first signal from the network (NIC is raising up/LAN is plugged), the 
time for authentication can be few seconds. If a client’s network connection is broken, 
it has to do the authentication every time the connection comes back. For example for 
network segment with 40 nodes, the LAN switch where all the 40 nodes are connected 
goes broken. This means that all 40 clients are disconnected from the network. When 
a LAN switch is changed for a new one, all 40 clients try to authenticate the network.  
The recommendation is that network has several VPN servers (authentication servers), 
in other words: authentication infrastructure has to be distributed.  
6.8 Using EAP-TLS authentication in client’s NAC 
 Implementing EAP-TLS authentication method for the client’s NAC solution requires 
802.1X and certificate infrastructure to the network. Because of the mutual 
authentication in EAP-TLS, from authentication perspective this method kills two 
flies with one hit; the network is authenticated and the client is authenticated in the 
same authentication conversation.  
The only problem is that the client using EAP-TLS authentication can still send traffic 
to the network if the network has not the 802.1X infrastructure. To address this 
problem EAP-TLS client requires tailoring. When the client turns itself to passive 
listening mode to start an EAP conversation, there also has to be object which 
observes the client’s outbound network traffic and the result of the authentication. 
This object denies all traffic except the EAP conversation until the authentication is 
over. If the client gets EAP-success packet from authentication server the object 
which is observing the traffic and authentication result allows all network traffic to the 
network and the client can be sure that network is trusted. In the case of EAP-failure, 
the observing object does not do anything; all other traffic (except EAP) is still 
denied.   
 
60 
7 COMPARING CLIENT’S NAC AUTHENTICATION 
ALTERNATIVES 
In the previous chapter six different methods for authentication in client’s NAC 
implementation were represented. All methods are applied from different network 
protocols or security architectures. In all cases the client’s NAC implementation needs 
a certain application which uses these protocols or architectures to authenticate the 
network. The network authentication methods are divided into two different 
categories:  
 Authentication by using the basic network protocols 
 Authentication by using certificates and security architectures  
Information security is about tradeoffs between security and usability. High security is 
usually meaning awkward usability and vice versa. The environment defines how 
secure the implementation has to be. In high secure network environment the security 
is the main factor when choosing the authentication method and in lower security 
networks (e.g. wireless LANs), the complexity of implementation is the main factor 
(less complex is better). Basically authentication methods which use basic network 
protocols (NBT, DHCP, DNS) and shared secret are directed to lower security 
networks and authentication by using certificates is directed to higher security 
networks. 
 Because client’s NAC authenticates the network without user interactions (network to 
computer authentication, which the user does not see), the usability can be measured 
with how long the authentication is lasting and if there is a single point of failure in 
the authentication scene. At this point of research, we do not have any finished 
implementations of authentication module, so we cannot measure the authentication 
time. We can only set demands for the time. Single point of failure can be prevented 
with good designing of the authentication method. Security is also affecting usability, 
e.g. if authentication method is vulnerable for denial of service attacks, it causes 
usability problems if clients cannot connect to a trusted network. The usability is hard 
to analyze at this point, therefore choosing the best authentication method for client’s 
NAC implementation is based on two different analyzes:  
 Security analysis 
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 Implementation analysis 
As explained in chapter “5.1 Security protocols, access control and authentication”, it 
is not rational to implement protection against all possible threats. Security protocols 
are typically designed under certain assumptions about the threats. The purpose of a 
security analysis is to evaluate if the protocol manages the threats. The security 
analysis is done by analyzing what threats a certain authentication method has and if it 
is possible to exploit these threats with certain attacks. Microsoft uses their own 
STRIDE method to categorize threat types, but in this security analysis three most 
common attack types were chosen which are used to exploit vulnerabilities in 
authentication or security protocols. These attack types are: 
 Man in the middle attack (MitM) 
 Replay attack 
 Denial of service attack 
If the authentication data that is sent over network is unencrypted (plaintext) the 
eavesdropping is quite easy, thereby the encryption of the authentication traffic is also 
an important factor in the security analysis. 
The implementation analysis is done by analyzing how hard it is implement certain 
authentication alternative. How much tailoring does a certain method need? 
In chapter six three different methods to use authentication were described by using 
the basic network protocols. These methods were: 
1. Using NBT for the network verification and authentication 
2. Using DHCP protocol for authenticate the network 
3. Using DNS for authenticate the network 
The methods to use authentication by using the certificates and security architectures 
were: 
1. Authentication with Microsoft L2TP/IPSec VPN Client and certificates 
2. Certificate based authentication using IEEE 802.1X and EAP-TLS as a 
authentication protocol   
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The authentication methods are compared to each other with these analyses.   
7.1 Security and implementation analysis of NBT authentication method 
In NBT case there are three alternatives how to implement authentication.  
The first alternative authentication method is that a client listens for a certain name 
registration broadcast from the network.  This can be called a NBT with beacon 
authentication method. The basic idea for this method is that there is a “beacon” in 
every subnet which broadcasts its NetBIOS names to subnet; the client computer can 
make decisions based on the beacon’s NetBIOS name if the network is a trusted one. 
The method is based on shared secret. The client has a hashed key value of the name 
stored to its hard drive. If the beacon’s name matches with the name in the client’s 
hard drive, the network is trusted.  The advantage of this method is that it is quite 
simple to implement. The disadvantages of this method are that shared secret is sent 
over network unencrypted and this is vulnerable of all exploits that were described 
above: MitM, replay attack and DoS. For example DoS attack is extremely easy to 
implement; sending a forged message to the beacon computer insisting that its name is 
not unique. In this situation the beacon computer becomes unavailable to other 
computers on the network and client computers cannot authenticate the network which 
means that they do not trust the network and stay unconnected.  
MitM is implemented by eavesdropping the beacon’s traffic. If client is connected to 
an untrusted network, sending the same NetBIOS name that the original beacon had to 
the client, the client believes that the network is trusted.  
If we change the beacon’s functionality in some way that the name that is broadcast to 
network is encrypted and hashed, this would prevent the threat of replay attack and 
mitigates the threat of MitM. The broadcast packet should also contain a nonce value 
and a time stamp. Denial of service threat can be mitigated from Windows registry by 
enabling the “NoNameReleaseOnDemand” value (MS00-047 2007). This does not 
prevent all DoS attacks. DoS attack could be created by replacing the original beacon 
with a rogue beacon which sends false authentication information.    
With these improvements the authentication method is more secure but also it is more 
complex to implement. These improvements also change the whole idea of using NBT 
information; with improvements the authentication method can be any authentication 
method which uses challenge/response and shared key information. The basic 
63 
vulnerability in a shared secret is that when the shared secret end ups in wrong hands, 
the method is easy to exploit.  
The implementation of NBT with a beacon is quite difficult to implement because it 
needs a beacon to every subnet. The beacon has to have certain functionality and the 
client has to have certain functionality to make decisions about the network. 
Applications have to be made for both entities. The baseline for a client’s NAC 
solution was that only the client needs the application. The beacon also creates a 
single point of failure to authentication, if the beacon is down, client could not connect 
to the network. Therefore, every subnet needs several beacons which make the 
implementation very clumsy. 
The second alternative for using NBT to authenticate the network utilized WINS 
servers. The idea was that client is sends a certain NetBIOS name request and if the 
answer is positive, the client initiates NetBIOS session connection to this certain 
computer. If a session is established, the network is correct.  
The advantage of this method compared to the previous alternative is that this does not 
need the beacon to every subnet. If the name that the client asks is always different, 
for eavesdropper it is harder to figure out what is the authentication method. The 
client just asks for the NetBIOS names. If the client does not send any other traffic 
than the NetBIOS name requests to network, eventually it can be easy to make 
conclusions that this has to some kind of authentication method. If the name request is 
always different the client needs a list of NetBIOS names of the network. The name 
that is requested is randomly chosen from the list. The NetBIOS session connection is 
also chosen randomly from the list. The shared key information that the client has is 
WINS server IP address, the list of the network’s NetBIOS names. This method is still 
vulnerable for DoS attacks. For example the name request can be eavesdropped and 
changing the answer information to false causes denial of service, because if the client 
does not discover the name from its list it believes that the network is not trusted. 
MitM attack can be done to bluff that the network is trusted, if a hostile entity has 
enough information from the original trusted network.  
This authentication method is much simpler to implement than the first NBT 
alternative, only WINS server is needed and a tailored application to the client. In 
most networks there are several WINS servers, so this is also solving the single point 
of failure threat. 
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The third alternative is authentication using NetBIOS scope ID. The idea was that 
the client and the network’s other computers have a certain NetBIOS scopeID. 
ScopeID is configured from Windows registry by IT-support. If the client cannot 
establish a NetBIOS session to a certain name/computer, the network is untrusted. 
Table 2 is presenting the summary of NBT authentication security analysis. 
TABLE 2. Security analysis of NBT authentication methods  
Authentication method MitM vulnerability Replay attack vulnerability DoS vulnerability Encryption 
NBT with beacon yes yes yes no 
NBT and WINS yes yes yes no 
NBT and scope ID yes yes yes no 
 
There is no authentication between NBT packets, and NBT traffic is unencrypted. 
Thereby it is very easy to eavesdrop and capture this authentication information which 
is built over NBT services. Methods which are described above are vulnerable for 
man-in-the-middle attacks (middle person attack), replay attacks and denial of service 
attacks (DoS).  
If NBT services are chosen for authentication process, there has to be an additional 
component, which encrypts the authentication traffic and authenticates peer 
computers. For example, IPSec connection to WINS server or certain host with certain 
scopeID. Windows XP has a VPN client and IPSec policy (“security rules and settings 
that control the flow of IP traffic inbound and outbound on a host”) which can be 
created and managed centrally in Active Directory using Group Policy objects. 
Windows IKE can use The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol, so the need for 
a PKI could be avoided, which is often difficult to deploy. When the client computer 
initiates NBT session to WINS server for name request, the client has IPSec policy 
assigned for this action. The outbound connection request triggers an IKE negotiation 
to the server. The client IKE obtains a Kerberos ticket to authenticate to the server. 
The example of the analogue method was explained in chapter “5.4.1 Server and 
domain isolation techniques”. Table 3 is describing the improved NBT authentication 
security analysis. 
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TABLE 3. Improved NBT authentication 
Authentication 
method 
MitM  
vulnerability 
Replay 
attack  
vulnerability 
DoS  
vulnerability Encryption 
Improved NBT with  
IPSec policy 
no no no yes 
 
Using just the NBT to implement an authentication method is not a rational idea 
because of the lack of security in NBT implementation. Using Windows group policy 
and IPSec improves the security and authentication, but this can be done for any 
protocol, so this is not a method just for NBT.   
7.2 Security and implementation analysis of DHCP authentication method  
Using DHCP protocol in the client’s NAC implementation as an authentication 
method has also three different alternatives.  
The first alternative was to use RFC 3118 DHCP authentication. The authentication 
is based on shared secret. MAC is computed from the message and the shared key 
(symmetric key) with HMAC-MD5 algorithm. The advantage of this is that the shared 
secret is never sent over the network as plaintext. The authentication option also 
includes a replay detection field which is basically a counter. This field mitigates 
replay attack threats. As explained in chapter “5.3 DHCP authentication”, the first 
DHCP message the DHCPDISCOVER message is not authenticated. Hostile clients 
could flood the servers with DHCPDISCOVER messages which cause DoS 
vulnerability to the DHCP authentication. DoS vulnerability is not just with discover 
messages; also flooding the server with authenticated messages can prevent the 
server’s normal functionality because of huge CPU load. CPU load increases because 
the authentication keys for the incoming messages are computed. Delayed 
authentication is also vulnerable for MitM attacks. If the symmetric key is too 
predictable or too short, it is quite easy to compute the key.  
As explained in chapter 5.3, the problem in implementation of DHCP authentication is 
that Microsoft does not support the RFC 3118; therefore, the DHCP client and DHCP 
server have to be implemented by self. There also has to be an observing application 
which observes the network traffic and DHCP authentication messages to make 
decisions, whether the network is trusted.   
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In the second alternative the client uses the tool which can find rogue servers to 
authenticate the network. Dhcploc sends DHCPDISCOVER messages to the network 
and tries to find if there are rogue servers. Dhcploc tool is based on IP addresses, the 
trusted server IP address is configured to a tool and the tool searches other than trusted 
servers from the network with discover messages. Placing a rogue server to the trusted 
network causes a DoS attack because clients do not trust the network. 
The implementation of this method needs a Dhcploc tool which has to be 
preconfigured and a certain application which observes the Dhcploc tool outcomes. 
This is quite easy to implement because Dhcploc tool is a command line tool, so with 
the command line script this tool could be utilized. Script outcomes are passed to the 
observing application which makes the decisions if the network is trusted. 
In the third alternative the client has a key which is created from network settings 
and stored to client by offline. These kind of settings are DHCP server IP address, 
DNS server address and subnet address. The key is computed from these attributes. It 
has already been mentioned many times that there is no proper authentication and 
encryption in the original DHCP protocol; therefore it is easy to forge, capture and 
alter DHCP messages. Table 4 has a summary of security analysis of the DHCP 
authentication methods. 
TABLE 4. Security analysis of DHCP authentication method 
Authentication method 
MitM 
vulnerability 
Replay attack 
vulnerability 
DoS 
vulnerability Encryption 
DHCP with RFC 3118 
no  
(yes, if shared 
secret is exposed) 
no yes Yes 
DHCP and  Dhcploc yes no yes no 
DHCP setting information  
as a authentication key 
yes yes yes no 
7.3 Security and implementation analysis of DNS authentication method  
Windows XP’s stub resolver does not support DNSSEC validation, but it still stores 
the RR information to its cache. The RR information that it stores to resolver’s cache 
can be used to authenticate the network. The client’s shared key in this case is security 
aware DNS server’s public key information (DNSKEY resource record). When the 
client has queried certain name information from certain DNSSEC zone, the server 
responds with the answer (A resource record) and its digital signature (SIG resource 
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record). The client compares its DNSKEY information (shared key) to the received 
signature (SIG) information and if the signature is the right one, the network is trusted.  
This method is forgeable, because the stub resolver and Windows 2003 server cannot 
set the DO, AD or CD bit in DNS query/response and they cannot make validation of 
key information. Copying the original SIG and using this same signature information 
in an untrusted network, clients believe that they are in a trusted network or in MitM 
attack forging the SIG prevents the client to join to the trusted network creates a DoS 
vulnerability. Although the method that is described above is forgeable by sending 
forged DNS responses, it is still hard to setup a bogus DNS server which has same 
information (signatures, keys) than a real DNS server. An untrusted network should 
have the same zone information for test.com zone, because signatures are basically 
made by hashing the zone data and signing it with a private key. Therefore a bogus 
server needs exactly the same zone information as the real server and same private 
key. It would be easier to eavesdrop traffic than set a bogus server and change the 
contents of the DNS packets by MitM attack, because stub resolver and Windows 
2003 server cannot do validation of messages. 
The same kind of DNSSEC authentication method with Windows 7 and Windows 
2008 server would very liable and secure, because Windows 7 has a security-aware 
stub resolver and Windows 2008 server can do DNSSEC validations. The server 
makes a validation of RRs and the client authenticates with IPSec/IKE the server.  
In chapter “4.2.3 Windows and DNSSEC” is described how Windows 7 utilizes the 
DNSSEC information. The client has a “Name Resolution Policy Table” which 
describes what kinds of procedures are done when querying certain DNS information. 
From this NRPT technique, we can conduct by using “Server and Domain Isolation 
Using IPSec and Group Policy” techniques and DNS protocol a very secure 
authentication method for a client’s NAC. The authentication method is described in 
chapter “5.4.1 Server and domain isolation techniques”. IPSec ensures that the 
authentication is secure and because DNS servers are configured to client’s network 
settings and there can be several servers, this method also ensures that there is no 
single point of failure in authentication and network access process.   
 Using DNSSEC information to authenticate the network, the network needs a 
security-aware DNS server and DNSSEC infrastructure. The authentication method 
created with IPSec and group policy can be done with infrastructure that already exist 
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and is more secure than DNSSEC authentication, if the client is Windows XP 
computer. In all authentication methods the client must have an application which 
observes DNS messages and it has to be functionality to send certain DNS queries to 
certain DNS server (observing module). Table 5 is representing the summary of DNS 
authentication security analysis. 
TABLE 5. Security analysis of DNS authentication methods 
Authentication  
method 
MitM 
vulnerability 
Replay attack  
vulnerability 
DoS 
vulnerability 
Encryption 
DNSSEC with Win XP yes yes yes no 
DNS with Win 7 no no no Yes, partly encrypted 
IPSec, Group Policy and 
DNS 
no no no Yes 
 
7.4 Security and implementation analysis of IPSec, EAP-TLS and OE with 
certificate authentication method  
Security protocols IPSec and TLS have the same idea for encrypting the traffic; both 
protocols use symmetric keys in encryption/decryption process. Still these protocols 
are developed for different purposes. IPSec encapsulates and secures IP packets 
between source and destination IP addresses. TLS operates at the transport layer in the 
OSI model and secures traffic between two applications.  
Both authentication methods are highly secure because of certificates and encryption 
of the authentication traffic. During the IKE negotiation (phase 1) IPSec peers 
authenticate packets with digital signature. Both peers change each other’s certificates 
to validate the digital signatures. Peers have also the trusted CA’s certificates.  
In EAP-TLS authentication the RADIUS server (authentication server) initiates TLS 
session with client (supplicant). The server sends its digital certificate to the 
supplicant, which the supplicant validates and vice versa. In the same way as in IKE 
authentication, both entities have trust the other’s certificates. Both authentication 
methods are not vulnerable for attacks what are presented in this chapter.  
In the EAP-TLS authentication only the authentication is encrypted and secured, in 
IPSec the idea is that all traffic is encrypted, not just the authentication. The demand 
for client’s NAC implementation is that the access process which includes the 
authentication should be secure as possible; there is no need for further encryption. 
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Securely composed knowledge what is the reliability of the network is enough for the 
client’s NAC. Therefore, the EAP-TLS provides enough security to authentication.  
If there is a need for further encryption between nodes, it can be made for example 
with Opportunistic Encryption (OE). In this technique the goal is not the 
authentication, it is designed for securing the traffic with encryption. The idea is that 
unknown peers creates IPSec tunnel if it is possible ("Server Request Security") and 
keys are changed with IKE which queries them from security-aware DNS server. It is 
already noticed that, for example Windows XP computer cannot validate DNSSEC 
information, but in a network where the network is authenticated which is the main 
idea for client’s NAC, the consumption is that network is trusted and its nodes are 
trusted. Client’s NAC solution makes the OE much more secure, because the baseline 
is that all clients authenticate the network and clients which are in trusted network 
trust each other.   
Security is similarly equal in these two authentication methods; thereby the 
implementation solves the difference between these two methods. Both need the PKI 
infrastructure, which can be difficult to implement. IPSec can be easily deployed in 
Windows environment, because Windows XP computers have a built-in IPSec client.  
The EAP TLS needs the 802.1X infrastructure which means that all of the switches in 
the network (or at least those that clients and servers connect to) must support 802.1X. 
The infrastructure needs to be fairly up-to-date. Therefore, the IPSec authentication 
with certificates is a better choice for a client’s NAC solution. The IPSec 
authentication with certificates could be implemented in the same way that is 
presented in chapter 6.7 (IPSec, Kerberos and DNS). It ensures that there is no single 
point of failure in authentication infrastructure, because (larger) networks usually have 
several DNS servers. Table 6 presents summary of all authentication methods and 
their security analysis. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The process of designing and maintaining security in an organization's networks is a 
classic IT challenge. The mobility of devices and the increasing amount of 
vulnerabilities in applications and network protocols creates these challenges. These 
vulnerabilities are discovered because security aspects have changed rapidly in past 
years. Fortunately, there are commercial concepts such as Network Access Control 
and Server and Domain Isolation to address these challenges. These concepts have 
technical differences, but the ideology is the same; the communication is based on 
trust.  In both concepts a network has different security layers (figure 11) to which 
trusted and untrusted devices are pointed out depending on the outcome of the 
validation process. A network has equipment and different techniques to validate the 
devices which try to get access to the network’s recourses. These concepts have the 
network’s perspective.    
Authentication method MitM vulnerability 
Replay attack  
vulnerability 
DoS vulnerability Encryption 
NBT with beacon yes yes yes no 
NBT and WINS yes yes yes no 
NBT and scope ID yes yes yes no 
Improved NBT with  
IPSec policy no no no yes 
DHCP with RFC 3118 
no  
(yes, if shared  
secret is exposed) no yes yes 
DHCP and  Dhcploc yes no yes no 
DHCP setting information  
as a authentication key yes yes yes no 
DNSSEC with Win XP yes yes yes no 
DNS with Win 7 no no no 
yes, partly 
encrypted 
IPSec, Group Policy and DNS no no no yes 
IPSec with certificate no no no yes 
EAP-TLS with certificate no no no yes 
Opportunistic Encryption no no no yes 
 TABLE 6. Security analysis of all presented authentication methods 
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FIGURE 11. Different logical security layers 
Server and Domain Isolation and Network Access control protect the network and its 
recourses. The protection is based on a validation process which ensures that only 
trusted devices get access to the network and its resources. The baseline for this 
research was that there are concepts and products which protect the network but there 
is no commercial solution which protects a single computer analogue to e.g. NAC. In 
this thesis, one of the main investigation issues was how it is possible to mitigate the 
threats directed to single a computer when it is connected to an unknown/untrusted 
network. This method was named client’s NAC. The investigation was started by 
analyzing the client computer’s network traffic. 
8.1 Analysis of client's network traffic 
 The first logical step was to examine the client’s communications flow towards the 
network. The purpose of this examination was to discover most common types of 
network traffic and find out those protocols and applications that generate traffic and 
should be secured from untrusted devices. 
The traffic was captured in a test environment and the fundamental result was that, 
when Windows client is connected to a network is starts sending NBT traffic towards 
the network. This traffic is basically NetBIOS name registration traffic. The client also 
uses other protocols to communicate with other computers in Windows networks. 
These common protocols are: SMB protocol (Server Message Block), DNS protocol, 
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) protocol and depending on IP address setup, the 
DHCP protocol. An example of a protocol capture can be found in appendix 1.   
On a Windows LAN, it is common to have UDP ports 137, 138, and TCP port 139 
enabled for NBT and TCP port 445 enabled for SMB. These ports provide NetBIOS 
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name resolution services, datagram services and session services in addition to other 
features. Unfortunately, these protocols also provide certain vulnerabilities. One 
example is null session exploit, which is described in chapter “3.6 Security threats in 
NBT “. An essential discovery was also the fact that NBT cannot be fully switched off 
from pure Windows 2000/2003 networks, because NetBIOS has so deep integration 
into Windows networks.  
These findings strengthened the necessity for the solution which has analogue 
ideology than NAC has, but has a single computer’s perspective. Because of the 
commonness of the DNS, DHCP and NBT protocols in Windows networks, these 
protocols were chosen for detailed examination and the goal was to find out if these 
protocols could be applicable for the client’s NAC authentication process. 
8.2 Controlling the client’s joining to the network 
Network protocols such as NBT, DHCP and DNS have vulnerabilities. When these 
protocols were implemented, there were not so many security threats on the Internet. 
Therefore, security aspects were not taken under consideration in the design phase of 
these protocols. Usually organizations block ports which these protocols use with a 
firewall on the perimeter of the network. With this traditional method organizations 
mitigate the threats which come from outside the organization’s network – threats 
from the Internet. This does not prevent threats which come from the inside of the 
network. DNS and DHCP protocols have security extensions which have been 
developed because of their poor security. These extensions are DNSSEC and DHCP 
authentication which are described in RFCs 4033 and 3118. These methods include 
authentication and thereby they were also chosen to analysis if these extensions could 
be applicable for client’s NAC authentication.   
In the original Network Access Control or Server and Domain Isolation concepts the 
authentication is the most important function to validate if the device is trusted or not. 
There are also other targets which are validated such as absence of malware, updated 
malware prevention tools, patch management and specific firewall settings, still the 
authentication is most important function because it controls which devices have 
access to the network resources. Alike in the client’s NAC solution the authentication 
is also the most important function to control client’s joining to the network. The 
client has to validate if the network is trusted. The client’s NAC has an opposing 
viewpoint to the original NAC concept. When NAC identifies trusted computers, the 
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client’s NAC identifies a trusted network. If the client can make decisions about the 
connected network, it can be, for example sure that the DNS server or DHCP server 
are not rogue servers which offer forged information. Forged information can e.g. 
forward a client to a forged website, which can cause a worm infect for the client. The 
intelligence that offers for client the information from the network and how to make 
decisions is a combination of observing module (observing application) and 
authentication module. These are described in chapter “6.2 The basics of client’s 
Network Access Control”.  
8.3 Choosing the best authentication methods for client’s NAC 
Information security is about tradeoffs between security and usability, therefore the 
environment defines how secure the implementation has to be. In this thesis the 
authentication methods for the client’s NAC is divided based on the environment. In 
high secure network environment the security is the main factor when choosing the 
authentication method and in lower security networks the complexity of 
implementation is the main factor. Authentication methods which use basic network 
protocols (NBT, DHCP, DNS) and shared secret are directed to lower security 
networks and authentication by using certificates is directed to higher security 
networks. This has a one exception which is Opportunistic Encryption. OE includes 
IKE authentication with certificates, but because most client computers (operating 
systems) do not yet have validation functionality to validate DNSSEC information and 
they cannot set the DO bit to a DNS query for receive a DNSSEC resource records, 
the authentication is not trustworthy enough. Thereby, OE is directed to lower security 
networks.    
This thesis introduced different authentication methods for the client’s NAC solution. 
There were methods which were conducted from network protocols such as NBT, 
DHCP and DNS. Most of these authentication methods were insecure or the 
implementation was difficult.  
By the result of security analysis and implementation analysis the best authentication 
method for the client’s NAC implementation is IPSec combined with Active 
Directory Group Policy, certificates and DNS. This method brings security, liability 
and is easy to implement. Windows IKE provides Kerberos authentication and 
certificate authentication. With certificates the authentication process is securest, but 
Kerberos is secure enough. The problem in Kerberos authentication is that it needs an 
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Active Directory infrastructure to operate. If a network already has a PKI 
infrastructure (or planning to have) and Active Directory the recommendation is to use 
certificates, if there is not PKI infrastructure, Kerberos authentication is 
recommended. The implementation is easy because Windows has a built-in IPSec 
client. If the group policy and IPSec policy is made for DNS traffic, it ensures that 
there is no single point failure, because organizations usually have several DNS 
servers. 
In the EAP-TLS method only the authentication is encrypted and secured, in the IPSec 
the idea is that all traffic is encrypted, not just the authentication. The demand for 
authentication for the client’s NAC is that the client could securely compose 
knowledge what is the reliability of the network. The EAP-TLS brings equal security 
to authentication than IPSec, but the EAP-TLS authentication needs both 802.1X and 
the certificate infrastructure to operate; therefore it is more complicated to implement 
than IPSec with group policy. If an organization plans to have or have 802.1X and 
certificate infrastructure, then the recommendation is to use the EAP-TLS 
authentication in the client’s NAC solution. 
For the lower security networks e.g. public WLANs, the recommendation is to use 
Opportunistic Encryption. WLAN administrators can, for example set up a DHCP 
server or DNS server to a network configured to use OE. A client computer which is 
also configured to use OE creates IPSec connection between DHCP or DNS server. 
When using OE, the securest authentication method is X.509 certificates. If both peers 
trust each other’s certificates, they also have trust the same CA. Therefore, 
administrators can give beforehand the CA certificate of the servers for the client. 
 If Thawte Freemail certificates (described in chapter “5.4.2 Opportunistic 
Encryption”) are used in the authentication a disadvantage is that anybody can create a 
personal certificate from the website. At the end the trust is based only an email 
address, because the certificate is obtained with giving an email address; the 
certificate is bound an email address. This is still better than operating without any 
authentication. In the future when the client computers have security-aware stub 
resolvers, the authentication in OE is more trustful, because the clients can validate 
the DNSSEC information from the servers. For example when a Windows 7 becomes 
more common, OE is very considerable authentication method in public networks. 
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8.4 Future work 
This thesis has research work and analyses how to develop client’s NAC solution, 
which mitigates the threats which arise when a computer is connected to an untrusted 
network. The analyses concentrate on different authentication methods which is the 
most important function in client’s NAC solution. The purpose of this thesis was to 
develop authentication methods from common network protocols and from known 
security protocols/architectures for the client’s NAC. These authentication methods 
were analyzed from security and implementation perspective.  
The best authentication method has been chosen by the result of security and 
implementation analysis. The basic functionality of client’s NAC solution is also 
designed in this thesis. The next step in client’s NAC development project is to 
implement a prototype solution and test the usability factors such as authentication 
time, how client’s NAC is recovering from network disconnects and if the duplication 
of authentication servers prevents the single point of failure issue. 
In future the goal is add more functionality to client’s NAC solution. Examples of 
these functions are: 
 Defense mechanism against worm infects 
  Different trust levels 
The worm infection in a computer usually causes abnormal behavior in the computer’s 
data communication. The infected computer scans the Internet seeking for vulnerable 
applications on hosts to infect. The client’s NAC solution could monitor the number 
of scans that a single computer sends out. If the amount of scans rapidly increases, the 
conclusion is that a computer has possible worm infection and data communication 
will be disabled.  
Even better functionality would be if the computer could observe the data 
communication in the LAN and make decisions on ground of the LAN traffic. If the 
LAN has abnormal data communication, the client will disable its network interfaces. 
The different trust levels would be desirable functionality, when authenticating for 
example public WLANs.  The client’s NAC solution could have different trust levels 
to use, e.g. in the certain trust level only certain applications could communicate with 
the network’s hosts. For instance, in this kind of case NBT communication could be 
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disabled or the client’s NAC could, for example deploy certain firewall rules for the 
client’s firewall. This functionality mitigates the threats which the untrusted 
computers and the LAN traffic create.       
In future the best way to protect computers and networks is to combine NAC and 
client’s NAC implementation. Client’s NAC ensures that computers are accessed only 
by trusted networks and NAC ensures that the network is accessed only by trusted 
computers. Organizations can mitigate threats which coming from inside and outside 
the network, if the network is trusted from client’s perspective and the network 
prevents unauthorized equipment from connecting to it.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. The capture of common LAN traffic in Windows networks 
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